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WELCOME FROM THE EMC CHAIR
Dr. Derek S. Reveron
EMC Informationist Chair, U.S. Naval War College

This third maritime-centric EMC Chair Symposium is a follow-up to the release of the 2015 “Cooperative
Strategy for 21st century Seapower.” The symposium will explore maritime strategy, concepts essential to
implement the maritime strategy, and international reactions to it. Participants from DOD, academia, and
the policy community will convene in Newport to discuss force development, maritime warfare, role of
technology, and humanitarian assistance. The implications are important for understanding the types of
missions combatant commanders will execute and the types of equipment and training the sea services
must provide to support these missions. This symposium in part fulfills the mission of the EMC Chair to
support the Navy’s efforts to develop thinking about maritime security. Additional materials can be found
at www.usnwc.edu/derekreveron.
In an effort to share expertise with the Fleet and national security community beyond this event, the
succeeding pages contain the working papers participants prepared in advance of the symposium. The six
panels are:
 Panel 1: International Perspectives on Maritime Strategy
The 2007 maritime strategy and its 2015 update stress the importance of partnering with
navies around the world to provide maritime security. The 2015 revision of the Cooperative
Strategy devotes an entire section to international partnerships because, “By expanding our
network of allies and partners and improving our ability to operate alongside them, naval
forces: foster the secure environment essential to an open economic system based on the free
flow of goods, protect U.S. natural resources, promote stability, deter conflict, and respond to
aggression.” The panel investigates this strategic approach to global maritime security, and
discusses the effectiveness and limitations of the strategy. By bringing together international
officers to reflect on the strategy and global role of the U.S. Navy, panelists will consider the
challenges and opportunities for an internationalist maritime strategy.
 Panel 2: Reflections on Maritime Strategy
The panel will review how the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard refreshed the 2007
Cooperative Strategy to keep pace with changing times. Panelists will explain the advantages
and drawbacks to how the sea services make strategy, draw lessons from the making of the
2007 maritime strategy, and furnish insight into how the services can execute the 2015
strategy in contested surroundings in Eurasia. The panel will shed light on how the U.S. Navy
in particular can revise organizational arrangements to put strategy in charge of programming
and budgeting--and thus reconnect maritime strategy to larger national purposes.
 Panel 3: Navy Force Development
The 2015 maritime strategy calls for the Navy to possess a wide ranging set of capabilities
including: all domain access, deterrence, sea control and power projection, and maritime
security. Along with these capabilities, the updated strategy brings forward several concepts,
which if implemented successfully, will enable the Navy to leverage partnerships with other
services and countries, better prepare its people to implement the strategy in the future, and
develop needed capabilities in the “electromagnetic-cyber” environment. This panel will offer
perspectives on what force structure elements will be needed to achieve these objectives
taking into account the growing threats around the world combined with budget realities.
 Panel 4: New Perspectives on Maritime Strategy
This panel will offer perspectives from young scholars to illustrate how strategic theory
interacts with the 21st century’s challenges. Serving as a bridge between today’s strategy
documents and the future, these scholars will offer new perspectives on maritime strategy.
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 Panel 5: Maritime Warfare
“A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” declares that “the Sea Services operate
in the world’s oceans to protect the homeland, build security globally, project power, and win
decisively. This ability to maneuver globally on the seas and to prevent others from using the
sea against our interests constitutes a strategic advantage for the United States.” Yet the
ability to maneuver is increasingly challenged as adversaries employ anti-access/area-denial
concepts and weapons against the U.S. and its partners. Consequently, new concepts are
needed to employ naval forces in denied areas. The aim of this panel is to investigate how the
sea services will operationalize the evolving concept of Joint Access and Maneuver in the
Global Commons(JAM–GC).
 Panel 6: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
Humanitarian organizations, international agencies, and militaries increasingly find
themselves faced with complex emergencies and natural disasters in urban settings. Future
climate change projections place coastal mega-cities at even greater risk than they are today.
The high population density and intricate physical infrastructures contained within urban
environments present a multitude of challenges to civilian-military coordination efforts and
can significantly hinder effective responses. The U.S. Armed Forces routinely supports the
U.S. Agency for International Development in responding to major disasters overseas that
threaten the safety and well-being of U.S. citizens, as well as those of other countries.
America’s Sea Services possess a broad range of rapidly deployable capabilities that have
proven critical to life-saving and relief efforts during complex crises, when other responding
organizations’ capabilities have been exceeded or are unable to provide a comprehensive
response given the magnitude of the disaster. This panel will explore the challenges that exist
during urban emergencies and possible strategies, concepts, training opportunities, and
organizational changes that the U.S. Sea Services can institute to improve the efficacy of
civilian-military humanitarian responses in these environments.
Events like these are possible through the generosity of the Naval War College Foundation, the hard
work of our Protocol & Events Department, and the commitment to academic excellence by the
Department of the Navy and the U.S. Naval War College. While the Naval War College provided the
venue for these discussions, the views in this document are those of only the author and do not represent
any official position.
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS

ADMIRAL BILL HALSEY AND THE UNANTICIPATED STRATEGY: THE SOUTH PACIFIC IN
WORLD WAR II
Dr. Thomas Hughes
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

Before World War II, the United States Navy devoted decades of intellectual capital to War Plan Orange,
its masterful imagining of a conflict with Japan. Most of what the Navy bought and much of what it
thought from 1920 to 1940 was the product of this creativity. Orange was a staple of the curriculum at the
Naval War College, and by 1941 virtually every flag officer eligible for command at sea was a graduate of
the Newport school, bequeathing to an entire generation of admirals a sound sensibility of the strategy
that guided the nation upon the vast maritime stage of the Pacific Ocean, so much so that Chester Nimitz
spoke for many when he opined very little of the actual war surprised him, having had practiced it so
often on the gaming board in Newport.
The South Pacific Theater was the one great exception. Before the war, neither Japan nor the United
States anticipated the scope of the fighting south of the equator. Japanese success in the war’s first
months, however, created momentum sufficient to birth embryonic ambitions for Australia and New
Zealand among Imperial officials—at the same time Allied supply lines from the United States to
Australia became sacrosanct after the war in North Africa had cut Britain’s Mediterranean routes to her
Oceanic commonwealths. Suddenly, sleepy South Pacific isles, heretofore known only to natives,
whalers, and coconut planters, became important enough to spark some of the war’s most sustained and
brutal combat in what strategists call meeting engagements—battles over areas with little intrinsic value
but where opposing forces collide nevertheless. This development would have astounded any respectable
pre-war strategist, in either Washington or Tokyo.
From the fall of 1942 to the spring of 1944 most of the Pacific War’s fighting took place on, near, or
above New Guinea and small South Pacific outcroppings. In the Solomon Islands, first on Guadalcanal,
then at New Georgia, and finally along the west coast of Bougainville, the compact geographic tableau
demanded triphibious operations, to use a phrase coined by Winston Churchill. Thoroughly integrated air,
sea, and ground campaigns, amid some of the globe’s most demanding environmental circumstances,
confronted officers of every service with a host of challenges not foreseen by Orange. How well they did,
both individually and collectively, helped determine the outcome along that edge of the world.
Bill Halsey assumed command of South Pacific forces on 18 October 1942, after Robert Ghormley
had failed to rally sufficient morale to fuel the epic struggle for Guadalcanal, then in its tenth week.
Within a week, he had committed the bulk of his sea power to the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands; within
a fortnight, he had commandeered every available resource within a thousand miles to succor the First
Marine Division defending Henderson Field; and within a month had won the Naval Battle of
Guadalcanal, putting the crisis of Guadalcanal behind the Allies.
That was but the start. With a pre-war career devoid of joint operational experience and training,
ignorance of fellow officers wearing Army khaki or, in most instances, Marine fatigues, and with even
less knowledge of Army, air forces, and Marine fighting ways, Halsey navigated command of a new kind
of war. This was a process marked first by hesitation and mistake and later by increasing confidence of
the kind history later bestowed upon him. Along the way, he and his command transcribed a steep
learning curve across the meaty middle of the war, at a time when the basic outcome was in doubt. At the
end of the line, in the spring of 1944 and with the Japanese bastion at Rabaul in effect the Allies’ largest
prisoner of war camp for Japanese, the war’s winner and looser were clear, even as great questions of
strategy and operations awaited the Central Pacific drive, the liberation of the Philippines, and a dozen
other things.
Across the entire period, War Plan Orange offered little direct guidance. But a generation of practice
for a war that was foreseen in basic outline rendered Halsey and his many cohorts well equipped to adjust
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when modification was necessary, to endure when endurance was right, and to distinguish between
stubbornness and perseverance in ongoing military operations—surely among the trickiest of all strategic
attributes. Any history of the any future would fairly brim with conceit, mistake, and imprudence, of
course, but confront the future we must—knowing full well of the vanity of the enterprise, of the nature if
not the specifics of blunders to come, and of the dangerous flirtation with folly. If predicting the future is
a fool’s errand, the process of imagining it, shaping it, and inventing it yields to the strategist rich
dividends in operational prowess, strategic acumen, political adroitness, and, most of all, mental agility.
As Dwight Eisenhower once famously opined, “Plans are nothing. Planning is everything.” Without it, we
have nothing, or maybe even less.
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PANEL 1: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY

A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER, AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE
ADM Nirma Verma, IN (Ret.)
U.S. Naval War College

Key documents released by the government of United States outlining its strategy and policy, like the
National Security Strategy or single Service Strategies, as also specific Combatant Command Strategies
are looked at with the greatest of attention by nations across the world. The intention being to see how the
security challenges and the mitigating strategies enunciated in these documents mesh in with a nation’s
own assessment. From the Indian perspective too, the U.S. National Security Strategy [NSS] (February
2015), the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower [CS21] (March 2015) and the “Asia-Pacific
Maritime Security Strategy” [APMSS] (July 2015), complemented by statements of senior DoD/U.S.
Navy leadership during Senate hearings, or in the public domain, have been viewed in context of the
Indian Navy’s own “Indian Maritime Security Strategy” released in in October 2015.
The View from India
With its unique maritime geography, India defines its primary area of maritime interest as extending from
the choke points of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok straits in the East to the Bab-el-Mandeb and Hormuz in
the West, including their littoral states, hugging the East coast of Africa and the Bay of Bengal littoral.
The secondary area extends from the South and East China Seas, to the Mediterranean and the Southern
Indian Ocean.
Threats are assessed to emanate from traditional and non-traditional sources. The traditional sources
refer to states with organized military capability and resources, which harbor adversarial posture and
inimical intent towards India. The likely sources of traditional threat would be from states with a history
of aggression against India, and those with continuing disputes or maintaining adversarial postures to
India’s national interests. At the same time, in recent years there has been a steady rise in non-traditional
threats, in occurrence and scale, with the lines at times getting blurred with traditional challenges. This is
especially the case where non-traditional threats receive cooperation, support and sponsorship from
traditional entities - most prominently ‘maritime terrorism’. Other non-traditional maritime security
threats include piracy and armed robbery at sea, unregulated activities at sea like trafficking/smuggling,
proliferation of private armed security in the maritime domain, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
(IUU) fishing, and the impact of climate change and natural disasters.
As to be expected, countering the traditional maritime threats will remain the raison d’etre of the
Indian Navy, particularly the way it is structured, equipped, modernized, trained and deployed.
Concurrently, India places utmost importance on its relations with its maritime neighbors based on mutual
respect for international law and norms.
Shaping a broader maritime environment to counter the flow of threats and challenges from one area
to another requires inclusive and cooperative efforts between the nations concerned and their maritime
forces. Hence of equal import are maritime engagements with extra-regional powers, more prominently
the U.S., to shape the maritime environment to mitigate traditional concerns and address non-traditional
threats for mutual benefit. India’s “Look East” policy, now transformed into the “Act East” policy, is
another manifestation of this principle.
The View Enunciated by the U.S.
The demise of the Cold War and economic reforms in India in 1992 ushered in a new phase of bilateral
relations that have since grown exponentially, and so reflected in the policy statements emanating from
both sides. The relationship has bloomed irrespective of the party in power in India. Commencing with
the “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” in 2004, through which the United States and India agreed to
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expand cooperation in three specific areas viz. civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs and
high-technology trade, the relationship has graduated to a robust mil-mil relationship with the two navies
taking the lead. This was later followed by 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance that emphasized the long-term
strategic partnership between the two countries. The maritime cooperation dimension is further embodied in
the documents released in 2015.
The 2015 NSS states that the two countries are primed to unlock the potential of the relationship. While
stressing the need for collective action to address global risks, in the context of India it states – “We see a
strategic convergence with India’s Act East policy and our continued implementation of the rebalance to
Asia and the Pacific.”
CS 21 (2015) issued following the ‘rebalance’ is a revision of CS 21 (2007). It is different in many ways
as brought out in a study undertaken by India’s National Maritime Foundation. The revised version is more
explicit in naming countries, either as adversaries, or allies and partners. It is also more forthcoming in
articulating the ‘ways’ and ‘means’, to the extent it is possible in the public domain. Further, inclusion of a
Preface by the Secretary of the Navy in the revised version is indicative of an enhanced political interface
with the Sea Services. It therefore adds to the credibility that the new strategy, which includes platform
numbers and their basing/deployment, is fiscally supportable. The strategy also addresses contemporary
challenges of cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare and integrated fires.
Of particular interest is that the major regions of the world have been addressed separately, and the
articulation ‘Indo-Asia-Pacific’ is indicative of the Pacific and Indian Oceans being looked as a single
entity. The emphasis on a ‘cooperative approach’ in addressing mutual maritime security challenges is
showcased in referring to it as a ‘global network of navies’. The strength of the strategy is that there has to
be only a willingness to cooperate; there is no commitment and a nation does not have to be part of an
alliance. In the revised CS21, nations can ‘plug and play’ with U.S. forces based on their national interests.
Most nations are hesitant to name adversaries and the revised CS 21 absolves them of this dilemma. It may
be expected that regional navies would be more forthcoming in exercising with U.S. Navy, and in the
process gradually build ‘interoperability’. However, it would certainly take a rather long time before partner
navies can be integrated into a Carrier Strike Group or an Amphibious Ready Group; to that end the revised
strategy is way too ambitious. At the same time, the revised strategy recommendation on promoting
cooperation between the Coast Guards in the region is an attractive option as it signals a cooperative activity
for delivery of public goods at sea.
The release of the “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy” seems to complete a full circle in
designating the region, after it being articulated by turn as the ‘Indo-Pacific” and the CS21 nomenclature
‘Indo-Asia-Pacific’. It is not that it is the result of de-hyphenation of the two oceans, as the document also
addresses developments in the Indian Ocean. In fact it recommends a three-pronged approach to maritime
cooperation with India: maintaining a shared vision on maritime security issues; upgrading the bilateral
maritime security partnership; and collaborating to both build regional partnership capacity and improve
regional maritime domain awareness.
The document “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” issued by the current CNO of the U.S.
Navy further reinforces the principle of maritime cooperation by calling for prioritizing key international
partnerships through information sharing, interoperability initiatives, and combined operations.
In sum, CS21 has a workable approach towards ushering in a global cooperative maritime security
mechanism. However, there is a need to exercise patience and immediate results should not be expected.
What is important is to move along the intended track.
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PANEL 1: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY

WESTERN HEMISPHERE PERSPECTIVE ON MARITIME STRATEGY
ADM Guillermo E. Barrera Hurtado, ARC (Ret.)
U.S. Naval War College

There are challenges and opportunities for an international strategy in the Western Hemisphere. The challenges
in the hemisphere can be summarized as: Transnational Criminal Organizations (TOC), Illegal Trafficking,
Terrorism/Gangs, and Instability in some countries.
Challenges
TOC are in some ways the result of a successful – but illegal – international business, known today as narcotrafficking, and many multiple-related criminal activities. Perhaps their biggest advantage is that they use all of
the instruments of power available to them in a comprehensive, coordinated and synchronized long-term
strategy, without ethics or respect for human dignity. Their power is growing so much, that many times they
are more powerful than law enforcement institutions and in some instances more powerful than nation-states.
Illegal Trafficking includes that of humans, narcotics, weapons, money, and smuggling of goods. These
illegal businesses are generating corruption, extortion via kidnapping and assassination, and in some cases
reducing governability, as is the case in some countries in Central America. And once narco-traffickers acquire
fully-submersible vehicles – which they will – only naval vessels equipped with submarine detection systems
will be able to locate them. The connection between law enforcement and security will have to be stronger.
Terrorism/Gangs: Colombia and Peru are still fighting terrorist organizations, but gangs continue to exert
influence in Central America, Mexico, Brazil, and other countries in the region.
Instability remains a problem in some countries of Central America which are transit countries for narcotraffickers, and are also affected by TOC and Gangs. Another source of instability is illegal migrations, a
lucrative business for TOC which creates refugees and illegal immigrants, not only from the south, but also
from Africa and Asia, through South and Central American corridors.
Many times, these illegal activities present threats to the security of countries, and in some cases, turn
them into failing states.
Another factor to consider is the fact that China is the first, second or third largest commercial partner to
most of the countries in Latin America. For example, Brazil – the largest economy in South America, and 22nd
largest in the world – shares 41.2% of its trade with China and only 26.7% with the U.S.
Other challenges to cooperation at sea in the hemisphere there are three main tendencies: first, those that
want to have cooperation in the hemisphere without the U.S.; second, those that want to have a good and
healthy cooperation with the U.S. based on common challenges and opportunities as partners; and third, those
that would like to have freedom of choice on whether or not to cooperate. Sovereignty, politics and ideologies
play a large role in these matters.
During the 2007 International Seapower Symposium (ISS-19), at which A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower (CS-21) was introduced to 104 heads of maritime services around the world, the theme of
narco-trafficking in the Americas was presented as a threat to the security of the states in the Americas. Chiefs
of Coast Guards showed interest, but not Chiefs of navies. Since then, narco-trafficking has permeated deeply
into countries of the region, affecting the stability and security of some. Since 2007, Brazil become the secondlargest consumer of cocaine in the world, and is a transit country for cocaine to West Africa. Mexico is now the
largest producer of amphetamines in the world, and is the fourth-highest country in homicides per 100,000
inhabitants, after Venezuela, Honduras and El Salvador; these two last countries are cocaine transit countries in
the Central American Corridor. And with regard to cocaine-producing countries, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia
remain the largest producers in the world.
Opportunities for Cooperation
Since the annual UNITAS exercise started in the 1950’s, the navies of the Americas have acquired concepts of
interoperability that could be the basis for coalition operations at sea against the common challenges in the
Western Hemisphere. After 2007, navies began to recognize that to differing degrees, TOC, narco-trafficking,
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and terrorism/gangs, were affecting the stability and security of the region. Today, there is a recognition among
navies of the serious threat of these challenges to the security and stability of their countries. Through their
respective Congresses, the U.S., Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Colombia (to name a few) have made important
changes to their laws, which have advanced legislation to empower the military to successfully combat the
threats, both individually or in coordination with other agencies and countries.
From the first to the last page, the 2015 “refresh” of CS-21 (referred to as CS-21R) refers to TOC, illegal
trafficking, and terrorism/gangs – as opposed to the National Interests of the U.S. – and all have been declared
matters of national security. Because all are common challenges for all countries in the Western Hemisphere, it
is a logical starting point for successful cooperation. In accordance with CS-21R, three of the five essential
functions of the maritime services are related to these challenges: Sea control, power projection and maritime
security, and all domain access. But also, CS-21R stresses the idea that “naval forces are stronger when we
operate jointly and together with allies and partners… working together in formal and informal networks, we
can address the threats to our mutual maritime security interest.”1
Section II of CS-21R specifically mentions the Western Hemisphere, and the need to “strengthen
partnership and capacity … (in order) to protect the homeland and counter illicit trafficking and transnational
criminal organizations … (and the three maritime services provide the means, training and engagement to) …
increase interoperability with regional partners and strengthen their capacity to interdict transnational criminal
organizations.” 2 Some countries are already working in this direction with the U.S., particularly Canada,
Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile, in support of Central American and Caribbean nations. Some regional
initiatives are starting to flourish.
Since the 1990s, and through bilateral agreements, maritime countries in the Western Hemisphere have
acquired interdiction capabilities and capacities. The individual and bilateral efforts had been partially
successful, but TOC, illegal trafficking and terrorists/gangs have not been defeated, and in some instances they
had been very successful. Is this because of the lack of a “Western Hemisphere International and
Comprehensive Strategy?” Perhaps it is time to speed up the tempo and be more effective in combating these
threats, just as ADM John M. Richardson is proposing to the U.S. Navy: the continuous evaluation of the
changing environment, and “designing” common objectives to be achieved in the short and medium term,
which in turn is the basis to create the conditions for “working together.”
In order to facilitate “working together,” the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, as well as the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, and
various Conventions on Terrorism (and other interrelated themes), are great frameworks to empower countries
to create the legal structure for cooperation and partnership, because no one country acting alone can be
successful. Countries can and need to help one another as each makes advances in the fight against these
challenges. But the most important asset needed is the will of each country to work together. Not addressing
and meeting the challenges to the region will continue to degrade the well-being of millions of human beings,
as well as the loss of life. Therefore, countries cannot afford to wait for consensus to attack these threats. We
need to find a starting point which at least some the nations of the regions can agree on. Once the train starts
moving, other nations will jump on board.
 What are the conditions that will facilitate the gathering of the capacities and capabilities of the
countries of the Western Hemisphere to face the challenges outlined above?
 What would an international maritime strategy to address these challenges look like?
 What can be done in the short term to increase both maritime cooperation and interoperability
successfully?
 How do we overcome political and ideological differences in order to protect millions of human
beings who are affected by the threats on a daily basis?

1
2

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power, p. 2
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power, p. 18
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PANEL 1: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY

AVOIDING THE DRAGON’S BREATH AND THE BEAR’S CLAWS
RAdm Christopher Parry, CBE
University of Reading

In the 21st century, the sea remains the pre-eminent medium of access and exchange. The two Eurasian,
continental powers, Russia and China, have recognised that the sea, as the engine of globalisation, is vital
to their ability to assert their status as great powers. They also are aware that the connections between the
sources of raw materials, production centres and markets confer an ability both to exercise control of
commerce and to offer the means by which further means of influence and coercion can be incorporated
into their diplomacy.
A recent speech by President Xi Jinping expresses these themes:
We should realize that the 21st century is the century of the sea as people have entered
into a period of nautical exploration.
Explorations of the sea have paved the way for China's future development and it is part
of China's strategic development that cannot be neglected.
During the process of China developing into a maritime power, the world should join
forces to safeguard maritime peace. If there is any maritime hegemonism, terrorism and
piracy, the stability of the world's waters cannot be maintained.
He concluded with the telling sentence, ‘The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must
be abandoned.
As the strategic level, both Russia and China are challenging the current rules-based international
system, with frequent statements about the need to ‘de-Americanise’ the world and its institutions. At sea,
there have been regular attempts to test the limits of toleration in either eroding or overriding international
or national entitlements, especially in relation to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. These
contraventions are consistent with their stated desire to recover sovereign rights across several areas of
strategic interest that they claim to have lost when agreements were negotiated when they were in a
position of inferiority or weakness. This approach is also expressed as an aversion to the status quo and
any cooperative agreement, when it does not suit their interests.
As evidence of their re-discovered interest in the sea, Russia and China are both expanding and
modernising their maritime forces to enable them to challenge the status quo at sea, notably with the
introduction of anti-access and area denial platforms and systems. These are benchmarked against the
capabilities of the naval forces of the free world and represent not only a considerable force-on-force
threat, but also inflict a disadvantageous cost ratio on western country and their allies in seeking to defend
against them.
However, it is Russia and China’s apparent intention and increasing capability to use the sea to
dominate and control their immediate neighbourhoods, in place of land-based interventions and
immediate coercive pressure that needs to be noticed in the context of the early 21st century.
Russia is busily extending its reach and capability to dominate the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the
Arctic, with the deployment of increasingly capable denial weapons and systems. Its occupation of
Crimea has seen a significant re-fortification of the peninsula, characterised by increasingly capable antisurface and anti-air weapons, backed up by powerful aviation, surveillance and offshore zone patrol
forces. A similar process is under way in the Baltic, with substantial enhancements to the Western
Military District and the exclave of Kaliningrad, most notably the use of sophisticated anti-ship missiles
and the S-400 anti-air system. The Arctic has also been significantly reinforced.
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Meanwhile, it is evident that China has adopted a territorial approach to the South and East China
Seas, with the overriding of the claims of its neighbours to economic zones, in gradually extending its
grip out to its so-called 10-dash line. The systematic construction of infrastructure and military facilities,
as well as the basing of combat aircraft and surveillance systems on the reefs of the Spratly and Paracel
groups is evidence of a determined drive to assert sovereign right, enforced by might.
These measures by China and Russia are not related simply to attempts to strengthen their relative
advantage in times of tension and war, but in peacetime as well, with the implicit threat of coercion being
conveyed to their neighbours. Russia and China appear to be applying anti-access and denial doctrine to
routine peacetime activity, as well as their wartime planning. Strategically, if Russia and China can
routinely exclude the U.S. and its allies from areas of sea (and the associated airspace) that represent their
‘near abroad’ they will increase their ability to dominate their regions both commercially and
strategically, while weakening the assurances and links between the U.S. and its major allies and treaty
partners. This process would have an extremely damaging effect on U.S. assurances to Europe and
NATO, on the one hand, and Japan and South Korea, as well as other Asia-Pacific partners that fear
China’s domination, on the other.
As such the issues at stake in the South and East China Seas represent a significant test case. If these
disputes are not resolved peacefully, future naval conflicts in other parts of the world are likely to revolve
around and result in a series of ‘land grabs’ at sea, just as land campaigns in the past were fought to
acquire land and assets. However, as long as China and Russia have more to lose than to gain from a
breakdown of the international system of law and trade, the current grudging acceptance of the status quo
seems set to continue, punctuated by a sequence of minor spats and disputes in the margins of UNCLOS.
Consequently, the first half of the 21st century in the region is likely to witness a series of tests of
will and resolve as both the U.S. and its allies and China and Russia probe and assess each other’s
responses to incidents on the ragged edge between ‘territorial’ claims and insistence on the freedom of
the seas. Incidents are likely to take the form of ‘encounter actions’ between single vessels or small
forces rather than substantial task groups. They are likely to involve the use of unmanned assets to probe
the limits of tolerance.
In the areas under threat, countries will probably have to decide on a case-by-case basis whether it is
worth risking confrontation and conflict in order to preserve their offshore integrity and the freedom of
the seas. Those that have a primary commercial partnership with either Russia or China and a primary
strategic relationship with the U.S. will have a particularly difficult dilemma. Those that possess decisive
military capability are likely to be able to threaten or use force to insist on their claimed rights or the
maintenance of the status quo. Those that cannot deploy forces or call allies in aid will be forced to back
down in the face of encroachment or exploitation. Unless the U.S. stands behind them, by speaking softly
(or loudly) and carrying a big stick, the ‘Melian Dialogue’ from the Peloponnesian War will probably
apply: ‘the strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must’.
The fundamental issue at stake is whether the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea will remain, by
cooperation or enforcement, the basis for the international order at sea. At present, only the U.S. is
prepared to challenge the blatant ‘land grab’ at sea by China and the various attempts at coercion by
Russia. Unless the world community is prepared to accept a post-Grotian world in which the freedom of
the seas gives way to controlled and exclusive sea-space, other countries will need to be prepared to assist
the U.S. in its task of ensuring that the seas of the world remain open to all those who wish to proceed ‘on
their lawful occasions.’
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PANEL 1: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY

RISKS, RHETORIC AND REALITY: UNITED STATES MARITIME STRATEGY 2015 AND BEYOND
CDRE Lee Cordner, RAN (Ret.)
The University of Adelaide

‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’ is a powerful declaratory statement in support of
ongoing United States aspirations to remain the most significant global power. It endeavours to achieve
this by asserting that the U.S. will maintain both the capacity and will to selectively dominate at and from
the sea. The document is written in clear, simple language that emphasizes recurring themes. It addresses
several audiences: the international community comprising allies and potential partners, and potential
adversaries; internal to the United States, political, government, industry and Department of Defense; and
internal to the U.S. ‘Sea Services.’
The Strategy could be re-named ‘A Hedging Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.’ It seeks to assure
different audiences about the continued primacy of U.S. seapower in an uncertain global security context,
a ‘turbulent world’ (p. 37), while advocating for domestic support and attempting to assuage everyone’s
concerns. A range of factors are identified that could combine to put achievement of the maritime strategy
‘at increased levels of risk’ in a climate of ‘fiscal austerity’ with a ‘smaller force’ and a reduced ‘footprint
in some geographic regions’ while facing the possible threat of further ‘sequestration’ (p.27). This
analysis of the latest ‘Cooperative Strategy’ briefly examines risks and vulnerabilities to delivering
against the Strategy, principally from an ‘India-Asia-Pacific’ (I-A-P) perspective.
The first major, overarching risk that the Strategy raises is that of unrequited expectations.
Recognition of the ‘rising importance of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region’ and the intent to deal with
‘A2/AD’ capabilities will be reassuring to regional allies and potential partners, and may deter potential
adversaries (China). Rising uncertainties in the A-I-P, despite ongoing U.S. reassurances about ‘the
Pivot’, mean that regional states feel compelled to adopt their own hedging strategies, which in turn
contribute to rising regional tensions and regional security uncertainty. I-A-P regional states will continue
to ask questions that impact regional security, for example, will the U.S.:
 Be able to deliver given the dynamic global security risk context against a backdrop of U.S.
fiscal and political uncertainty?
 Have the capacity to address geographically disparate and increasing global security challenges?
 Have the political will and acumen to apply effective maritime force in a complex, diverse and
increasingly competitive international scene?
A second major risk arises from continuation of the earlier ‘1000-ship navy’ theme, now described as
an aspirational ‘global network of navies’ (pp. 1 & 3). While the rhetoric is heartening to ‘long-standing
allies’ (p. 1) and perhaps to some potential partners in the A-I-P, the actuality of achieving this is
challenging. Admiral Greenert’s glib statement that ‘All it takes is a willingness to cooperate… anyone
can plug-and-play’ (p.5) trivialises practical factors including, for example: technological connectivity,
protocols and information security; doctrinal and tactical incoherencies; equipment and logistic
incompatibilities; language, ideological and cultural differences; and political factors. Very few navies
have the capability to effectively ‘plug and play’ with the USN in a high-end warfighting context, while
some others would be more interoperable with the U.S. Coast Guard. For countries that have formal
security alliances with the U.S., like Thailand, cooperation can be significantly constrained by political
factors; in this case the U.S. 1961 Foreign Assistance Act that restricts levels of military cooperation with
countries under military control. Even when the national interests of nations that commit to maritime
security operations significantly converge, for example, anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, the
real levels of cooperation with U.S. forces from many navies can be minimal.
There is a greater risk that translates into a significant vulnerability arising from the ‘global network
of navies’ concept. Countries like Australia, with formal U.S. alliances along with others are prone to
constrain investment in naval capabilities based upon a premise that the U.S. will come to their assistance
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if necessary. This may prove delusional if the U.S. is stretched and engaged elsewhere and if political
realities prevail. Further, there is a collective security risk if the Strategy is to some extent reliant upon an
unrealistic expectation that others will provide ready and capable forces to support the U.S., which could
lead the U.S. government to invest less in maritime forces. A related risk is achieving high levels of mutual
trust required for effective combined and joint operations inherent in ‘a deeper cooperative relationship
with our allies and partners and a greater emphasis upon Joint Force interdependence’ (p. 8).
A third risk in the Strategy concerns the numbers of platforms and capabilities of the U.S. Sea Services
and the stretch challenges of attempting to deliver against multiple commitments, including potentially
concurrent operations. The Strategy advises that there will be ‘more than 300 ships and a forward presence
of about 120 ships by 2020’ (p. 9). It further advises that the I-A-P will have ‘approximately 60 percent of
Navy ships and aircraft’ based in the region by 2020, which equates to around 72 platforms. Presence in
the Middle East will increase ‘from 30 ships today to about 40 in 2020’ (p. 13): is the Middle East part of
the I-AP? If so, that leaves around 30 platforms for the rest of the I-A-P and if not the combined
commitment is around 110 of 120 forward deployed platforms globally. This leaves little to reassure ‘vital’
NATO and European allies (p.14), provide ‘naval presence in Africa with adaptive force packages’ (p.16),
and to ‘strengthen partnerships and capacity in the Western Hemisphere’ (p.18). The U.S. Coast Guard will
support the USN in meeting some of these commitments and the inherent flexibility, agility and readiness
of U.S. Sea Forces (p. 28) will mitigate some of these risks.
Fourthly, there is an operational achievability risk presented with priority placed upon the new
‘essential function’ of ‘all domain access’ (pp. 19-22, 31-34) designed to counter the rising A2DA threat
posed by China (and perhaps Russia, although not mentioned). In essence, this concept requires a
combination of other ‘essential functions’ like sea control and power projection, including the ‘ability of a
nation to apply all… of its elements of national power’ (p. 24). Joint Force interdependence with the U.S.
Air Force and Army will be a vital factor, which is mentioned briefly in the Strategy (p. 28) although there
is scant detail on how this component of the Strategy will be achieved.
The final risk addressed here is funding and related U.S. political commitment. Fiscal concerns are
highlighted in the Strategy (pp. 27 & 37). Implementing any strategy is heavily dependent upon access to
resources; this will remain a critical vulnerability. Similarly, the U.S. polity with its peculiar checks and
balances, including an impending Presidential election, presents both opportunities and uncertainties that
could either enhance or reduce prospects of delivering against the Strategy.
Although there are risks and vulnerabilities including others not addressed here, ‘A Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’ is an important aspirational and declaratory statement of U.S. intent
to remain the leading global maritime power. The Strategy sends a powerful message to its several
audiences who will variously embrace, support and react. Achieving effective networks of navies is a vital
aspect of the Strategy for the A-I-P region. It will require high levels of commitment by the U.S. and the
region to deliver tangible regional security enhancements: the rhetoric and the reality will need to coincide.
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PANEL 2: REFLECTIONS ON MARITIME STRATEGY

REFLECTIONS ON THE 2007 MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE FUTURE OF MARITIME
THINKING IN THE U.S. NAVY
CAPT Peter D. Haynes, U.S. Navy
U.S. Special Operations Command

The 2007 Maritime Strategy is a bifurcated document, one that reveals tensions between its halves—the
first of which provides the “why” (i.e., the purpose of U.S. maritime forces) and the second addresses
“how” the strategy will be operationalized. Each represents a different strategic approach, only one of
which can be seen in the 2015 version.
The “why” represents the thinking of the CNO that commissioned it, Admiral Mike Mullen and his
deputy CNO for Operations, Plans and Strategy, Vice Admiral John Morgan. In 2006, Mullen had come
to the Naval War College and called for a new maritime strategy. “I am here to challenge you,” he noted,
“First, to rid yourselves of the old notion—held by so many for so long—that maritime strategy exists
solely to fight and win wars at sea, and the rest will take care of itself. In a globalized…world the rest
matters a lot.”
One would be hard pressed to find a comment by a CNO that was more damning of the Navy’s
narrow worldview. To Mullen and Morgan, the Navy had for far too long understood its purpose in terms
of warfighting. The Navy had embraced the battle-centric Mahan, and ignored the system-centric Mahan
and, as a consequence, the Navy had neglected the full range of economic and political effects that
American seapower can achieve, particularly in an era of globalization.
Another consequence was that the Navy squandered opportunities to form meaningful arguments in
relation to competing forms of U.S. military power—the Air Force and Army, who, unlike the U.S.
maritime services, did not have a preeminent role in sustaining the U.S. political and economic system
and underwriting the political, commercial, and security conditions necessary for the prosperity of the
United States and its key partners.
After all, a maritime strategy—in war or peace—has always been more directly concerned with the
relationship between the state and global markets than those associated with land or air power, a statement
as true of the Age of Sail as it is today.
The “why” half acknowledged that a maritime strategy was well-suited to the interests of a state
whose prosperity and security interests have always been linked to and depended upon the vitality of the
world economy, and to the free markets, open societies, and democratic politics that have (so far)
accompanied sustained economic success.
If the first half promised a radical shift in the Navy’s strategic outlook, the second, more pragmatic
“how” half promised the opposite.
The “how” half represented the operationally inclined thinking of the new CNO, Admiral Gary
Roughead, who fundamentally changed the section before signing the document. It reflected the
limitations imposed by the need to find consensus between the Navy’s “maritime-systemic” admirals and
the “warfighting” admirals, and the realities of rationalizing the Navy and Marine Corps in ways that
would derive fiscal support, the most proven of which was to do so in terms of warfighting, which what
the second half essentially did.
In the end, Mullen and Morgan got their maritime strategy (or at least, in retrospect, a maritime
strategic outlook), but how the 2007 Maritime Strategy would be implemented and resourced ultimately
accorded more with the preferences of warfighters like Admiral John Nathman and Secretary of the Navy
Donald Winter.
By itself, the 2007 version implied that while the ends of U.S. naval strategy had changed
fundamentally, with the adoption of the goal to protect and enable the system, the means would not be
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altered—and those means were all about warfighting. Although the ways in which those means were to be
used promised to change, there is little indication that they have.
In what was a brilliant fusing by Bryan McGrath of the deeply held beliefs of the Navy’s two factions,
the 2007 version was a hybrid strategy that essentially stated that the best way to protect and maintain the
system was to focus on deterring great-power wars from starting in the first place, and then from escalating
to the point where they threatened global stability or, in the case of the First World War, the system itself.
The 2015 version aimed to redress the most noted faults of the 2007 version—the lack of detail of
“how” the three services will be designed, organized, and employed, in which case it did in a thorough and
pragmatic fashion. The new version framed the maritime services’ purpose on what Geoff Till calls “a
more muscular emphasis” not on defending the system, but defending the nation. The “why” was in terms
of operational-level requirements associated with the need for forward presence, access and cyber
challenges, the pivot to East Asia, and the functions of deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime
security, and all-domain access.
So, if one were looking for an expansion of maritime thought in the 2015 version, and, specifically,
how U.S. maritime forces would enable the system and bring about the full range of economic and political
effects that American seapower can achieve in war or peace, one would be disappointed.
One might wonder if that absence and the 2015 version’s embracing of the 2007 version’s warfighting
logic signals a return of maritime ideas to the margins of consideration, the victim of the latter’s inability to
secure the funds for a large, globally deployed fleet.
If the 2007 version argues that the purpose of the U.S. maritime services should not be seen in terms of
the threats to the United States, but in light of the relationship between the United States and its system,
then the maritime services, with the 2015 version, seem poised to argue the opposite, and with it,
presumably, the assumption that “the rest will take care of itself.”
If one has doubts as to the future of maritime—as opposed to naval—thinking in the Navy, Jim
Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara remind us that one should have no such doubts on the part of the world’s most
avid students of Mahan—the Chinese, who are, at this minute, exploring how to derive the full range of
economic and political effects that Chinese seapower can achieve in war, peace, and the widening and noless consequential space between war and peace.
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PANEL 2: REFLECTIONS ON MARITIME STRATEGY

DEVELOPING MARITIME STRATEGY
Mr. Bryan McGrath
The FerryBridge Group

John Maynard Keynes is often quoted as saying something to the effect of “When the facts change, I
change my opinion. What do you do, Sir?” It is unclear whether Keynes actually uttered these words, but
they serve as a reasonable starting point for my role on this panel.
In December of 2009, it occurred to me that the facts had indeed changed, the facts associated with and
accounted for in the 2007 Maritime Strategy, with which I was generally associated as team lead and lead
author. Consequently, I took to the blogosphere to describe how my opinion had changed in a piece on
Information Dissemination entitled “Scrap the Maritime Strategy?” . In it and subsequent exchanges
elsewhere, I made the case that the financial crisis that hit a year after the Maritime Strategy was released-along with China’s increasingly more aggressive stance in the South China Sea and Russia’s aggression in
Georgia—had created a set of circumstances in which the fundamental assumptions underpinning the
strategy were now overcome by events. Believing as I did from the beginning, that the strategy should be
periodically reviewed and updated, I felt the time was ripe to do so.
I continued to maintain this position over the course of the next two years, and to it, I added a few
additional considerations also born of events. First, I believed that we were entering a new era of great
power contention, and that the country generally and the Navy specifically, needed to recognize this—
strategically. Second, the notion of a more integrated version of American Seapower began to arise, in no
small measure from the Marine Corps concept of “Single Naval Battle”, which seems to have been
consigned to ash heap of history, but which I believed was a superb notion for the provision of economical
and efficient conventional deterrence forces throughout much of the world that mattered to us.
In the fall of 2011, a newly announced CNO—Admiral Greenert—asked me to brief his transition
team on two specific items. The first was process. He wanted me to go over how we organized and staffed
for success in 2007, and what some of the challenges were. Secondly, he asked me to opine on how the
2007 document should change to reflect the new strategic environment. It was this second tasking that I
relished, and here are the main points of what I told them:
 The new document should explain why we need a strong, globally deployed Navy, and it should
clearly identify the threats to our nation that such a Navy mitigates.
 After clearly identifying the threats, it should clearly articulate how it will respond.
 It should return to a three-hub construct (Mediterranean/Europe, Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean,
Western Pacific)
 It should reference a classified companion document.
 It should embrace true integration between the Navy and the Marine Corps, not cooperation, nor
coordination, nor interoperability, but true integration.
 It should make a coherent argument for supporting an industrial base sufficient not only for
present needs but also for potential expansion.
I concluded that presentation with the following words: “The framers of the updated Maritime
Strategy have a unique opportunity, and that is the chance to influence Obama Administration thinking
going into an election year. To that end, the document should be more specific, less aspirational and
narrative-based, and more hard-edged than its predecessor. Such an approach would create a coherent
strategic predicate for shifting resources within the Department of Defense to adequately fund required
naval capability and capacity.”
Much to my chagrin and the disappointment of many others, the “refresh” of the 2007 strategy—which
I called for in December 2009 and which was discussed in detail in the fall 2011 CNO Transition Team—
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did not appear until the beginning of last year (2015). Its development process bore little resemblance to
the 2007 effort which, while I considered it to be cumbersome and bureaucratic at times, moved along
with alacrity when compared to the 2015 version. Additionally, the time it took to get the document out
resulted in team turnover, and the many iterations of the document showed consistent inconsistency of
authorship. Along the way, I was asked at various times to provide my input—as were a number of
others in this room.
When the document emerged, my friend and colleague Bryan Clark and I put out our thoughts in a
post at War on the Rocks. The main points we made were the following:
 The strategy does not sufficiently explain the role and application of American Seapower in
an era of increasing great power competition.
 The strategy establishes “all domain access” as a new function for the maritime services and
suggests it is their most important contribution to joint warfare, but the position of all domain
access in the strategy’s functional hierarchy is not clear.
 The new strategy does not address is the need for a robust naval and maritime industrial base.

What have I learned now from nearly eight years of working closely on Maritime Strategy, both as a
maker of it and as a critic?
 CNO Level interest and involvement is key. We had it in 2007, they did not in 2015.
 Make a plan, set milestones, meet them.
 Maritime Strategy must not only describe what is, it should describe what could be. It should
not be afraid to put upward pressure on national policy.
 Maritime Strategy must not be deaf to Joint capabilities, but its job is not to shill for them.
Maritime Strategy must describe the benefits conferred by Seapower.
 We have missed opportunities in two straight maritime strategies to make the case for a
viable naval industrial base, and this is unfortunate. At the level of true strategy, there is little
more important.
I believe the 2015 strategy was a solid effort, but my support for it has diminished since its release. At
the very least, the Department of the Navy should immediately begin to work on a classified strategy for
American Seapower in an age of great power contention. We are well aware of what the table stakes are
for great power dynamics, yet we seem unprepared to prepare for them. Some of this may be political, a
sense of not wishing to get in front of civilian leadership. But it is within the civilian leadership that these
ideas must take hold if effective strategy is to influence acquisition, planning, and operations.
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PANEL 2: REFLECTIONS ON MARITIME STRATEGY

A FLEET PERSPECTIVE ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY
CDR Andrea H. Cameron, U.S. Navy
U.S. Naval War College

One of the key benefits of the strategy was the deliberate, more specific integration of the sea services in
this document. Throughout the three years of staffing, the document had been thoroughly processed
through the bureaucracy that there is not much in it to object to on its face. The exercise of staffing the
strategy is team-building in itself and the promulgation of it gives that more unified perspective to the
members of the sea services. It connected the high end of the conflict spectrum activities of the USN and
USMC to the low end and constabulary missions of the USCG. Further, the return to a more threat-based
vision reflects the worse-case scenario business that we are in. Overall, the strategy was perceived as an
improvement over the 2007 strategy.
Content
With respect to the content of the strategy, there were changes that caught attention. First and foremost,
the strategy is one of total access with the primary objective being the ability to go anywhere and do
anything. This is not new necessarily, it replaced “full spectrum dominance” in the 1990s. Not only was
all domain access newly identified, it was listed first among the five functions, appearing to rank over and
above the standard naval functions of deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security.
One could even see all-domain access as a derivative of the historic functions of sea control or power
projection without a need for calling it out specifically. The appearance of preeminence reflects the more
threat-based thinking rather than the more systemic approach embedded in the 2007 strategy.
Second, one could ask: what happened to the systemic approach of the 2007 strategy? In this strategy
the Navy played a much broader with protecting the liberal world order, guarding the global sea-based
trading system, and utilizing the hard power assets to show both hard and soft power effects. In fact, the
inclusion of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief in 2007 marked a strategic shift showing that military
assets for soft power missions could produce strategically superior outcomes. The loss of this perspective
questions whether the strategy is actually strategic enough. And while it may play better in Congress who
funds the services, its threat-based approach simultaneously sends messages of reassurance and concern
rippling throughout the world.
One final comment on content, this strategy focuses on state and non-state actors as threats. The
potential threats to the future world include a variety of other concerns like climate change, population
migration, urbanization, pandemics, transnational crime, and resource competition. One major criticism is
what cannot be said in an unclassified document regarding regional assessments and capability
development. While this is managed through classified addendums, it is not broadly available information
to the fleet and leaves large gaps in overall understanding of what it might mean to them operationally,
tactically, or personally.
If the national strategy remains sustaining the world order, then inevitably, the military will play some
role as an instrument of national power in addressing these concerns. This new strategy does little to plan
for these inevitable events.
Operational Support
I do not do the fleet justice without mentioning the connection of the “we can do it all” strategy with the
operational tempo that rides on the back of the ships and Sailors. Using data from the CNO’s 2016
Posture Statement to Congress, since 2013, eight carrier strike groups, four amphibious readiness groups,
and twelve destroyers have deployed for eight months or longer. The escalation of optempo, complexity
of missions, and unpredictability of funding wreaks havoc among readiness, morale, maintenance, and
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modernization. To quote the CNO: “the gap between our responsibilities and our funding levels represents
risk -- risk of Sailors’ lives lost, of a weakened deterrent, of a slower response to crisis or conflict, of greater
financial cost, of uncertainty for our international partners -- all of which affect the security and prosperity
of America.” The strategy is challenging to fulfill operationally.
The Navy is struggling to balance the requirements placed upon it with the resources (platforms,
personnel, funding) available to complete the mission. The Navy has made operational changes trying to
accommodate requirements of the strategy and the nation, but perhaps not meet them all. One example is
shifting from a combatant command (CCMD) demand driven model for assets to a supply driven
availability model. This causes friction between the CCMDs and the naval service and leaves gaps in carrier
strike group availability that will need to be covered by the joint services. To date, this change has been
reinforced with the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Along with this is the revised Optimized Fleet
Response Plan (OFRP). This three-year cycle ties the ships in the carrier strike groups together for
scheduling, maintenance, training, and deployments. This more predictable schedule is to maximize the
employability of available force capacity and keeps ships just returned from deployment in a surge capacity
during a post-deployment sustainment phase. The benefits include predictable scheduling, synchronization
of modernization efforts within the strike group, and strike group cohesion, but it also has its drawbacks. It
creates peaks and valleys for maintenance and training facilities, which may not be supportable. Equally
important, the revised ship schedule does not match up with the aviation schedule of the carrier air wings.
The post-deployment sustainment phase is largely unfunded—meaning squadrons lose their flight
qualifications and even if the ship is ready to surge, its ability to be fully operational degrades significantly
within months of returning from deployment. For the foreseeable future the air wings and the strike groups
will not be able to maintain the same schedule. While the OFRP is a significant step forward in balancing
the operational needs of the CCMDs with the long term sustainability of the Naval force, the full feasibility
of it remains to be seen.
Considering this information, does the new operational structure support the overall strategy? One thing
in its favor is that something is finally being done to try to address the phenomenal operational tempo
stressing the fleet. However, the foundation of forward presence in the strategy is about giving more options
to the President in times of crisis and the operational structure of the new system may limit the options.
Endurability
The sign of a good strategy is the endurability of it. In favor of the threat-based approach, the strategy
remains valid until the threats change. However, it overlooks several other factors that could potentially
impact the long-term usefulness of the strategy. Internal to the force, the ways and means, operational
concepts, priorities, or force structure, will all play a role in the ongoing validity. Also, listing ship counts
was a controversial addition to the strategy. While it sets a benchmark, it is something that challenges the
endurability of the strategy. Externally, the strategy can be upended with political turnover, differences with
higher leadership within the DoD, budget cuts, programming, and acquisition. Things are changing fast in
the domestic and global environment and it is very possible that the sea services will have to write another
strategy sooner than later.
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PANEL 2: REFLECTIONS ON MARITIME STRATEGY

REFLECTIONS ON U.S. NAVAL STRATEGY BEFORE 2007
Mr. Peter M. Swartz
CNA

In 2005, newly-installed CNO Admiral Mike Mullen charged his Deputy Chief of Naval Operations with
coming up with a new “maritime strategy.” The result, after two years of intensive and multi-faceted
activity, was an unclassified public document -- A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower -published in October 2007. In 2011, newly-installed CNO Admiral Jon Greenert called for a “refresh” of
that document, and the result was a new unclassified edition subtitled “Forward, Engaged, and Ready,”
published one year ago. These documents will be discussed by my colleagues on this panel, and hopefully
by many of you.
But where did the idea that the Navy needed such a “strategy” come from? And what issues were
raised in the past that can shed light on recent and future efforts to develop naval or maritime strategy?
That’s what I’m going to discuss, by giving a few examples. (For more detail, see
www.cna.org/research/capstone-strategy-series.)
Modern efforts to codify U.S. naval strategic thinking started in 1970, with a classified document
drawn up by CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr. His Project SIXTY posited—and prioritized—four kinds of
capabilities of the Navy, later described and popularized by Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner as four
“missions:” “strategic deterrence,” “sea control,” “projection of power ashore,” and “naval presence.” The
Zumwalt-Turner thesis was that the Navy was coming off an era that had favored power projection (e.g.,
against North Vietnam) and had entered one that required more emphasis on sea control, given a rapidly
building global Soviet naval challenge.
Zumwalt also introduced the discussion of presence as a major U.S. naval capability: in part because
that was what the Navy actually delivered that was useful to the nation in the absence of war, and in part
because he sought the defense establishment to recognize that and provide the Navy with earmarked
resources to carry it out. (In this, he and his successors would be disappointed for 20 years). Zumwalt
also, given post-Vietnam War U.S. defense budget cuts, strove to develop what he called an appropriate
“hi-low mix” of platforms and weapons systems; supplementing the few, the complex and the expensive
with the many, the simple, and the cheap. You will doubtless note that these same themes have preoccupied U.S. naval strategists and policy-makers since, and still do today.
Zumwalt’s successor, Admiral James Holloway, did not find this construct useful, however, and
modified it significantly in a Naval Warfare Publication called Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy. An
ardent proponent of naval power projection and super-carriers, Holloway had the disagreeable job of
serving as CNO during the Carter Administration, which, apart from nuclear deterrence, viewed convoy
escort as the Navy’s only useful wartime mission, and lacked appreciation of what carriers and other
Navy platforms might achieve to deter or fight in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
A number of Navy efforts then ensued in the late 1970s to argue and demonstrate the virtues of the
Navy and its carriers in such a war, culminating in the initial formulations of The Maritime Strategy in
1981. That strategy was at once global, forward, offensive, allied and joint, and favored high-end
platforms and weapons needed—for sea control as well as power projection—to go up against the
powerful Soviets close to their own shores. The Maritime Strategy resonated well with many in the Fleet,
and most importantly nested comfortably within the defense policies and strategy of the Reagan
Administration and its strategy-minded Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman. The Maritime Strategy was
conceptualized by the Navy staff’s trained and experienced strategy specialists, using guidance from on
high and their own understanding of the role of naval strategy and policy and national security. It was
then drafted, vetted, promulgated, critiqued, updated and implemented – through fleet exercises, war
games, conferences, articles, speeches, CNO Strategic Study Group activities, and advanced fleet training
like “Top Gun” and “Strike U.” From 1982 on, it also provided the framework for the Navy’s annual
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internal warfare assessment process for developing the service’s program and budget proposals. Some
editions were classified and detailed, for internal Navy use; some were more general and unclassified, for
public explanation. The Soviets countered with a massive campaign to constrain the U.S. Navy through
arms control initiatives, and the later years of the 1980s saw successive CNOs develop strategies to deal
with this intense diplomatic offensive.
But then the Soviets went away. And the Navy developed a plethora of successive – and sometimes
simultaneous – ideas and documents to try to capture the essence of the Navy’s role in the murky postCold War environment, and the proper mix among naval capabilities and missions, and “high” and “low”
platforms and weapons. One milestone was Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s Bottom Up Review of 1993,
which allowed the Navy for the first time to justify its budget in part by its peacetime presence activities.
The Zumwalt-Turner vision was finally achieved. One result was the provision of funding for an
additional carrier battle group in the next defense budget. Another was the promulgation of yet another
Navy strategy document: Forward . . . From the Sea, by CNO ADM Mike Boorda in 1994. But dollars for
presence could also mean robbing Peter – cutting-edge U.S. Navy power projection and/or sea control
capabilities – to pay Paul –combatant commander demands for increased forward naval presence,
surveillance, and traditional strike operations. This issue is also salient today.
Boorda’s immediate successors promulgated Navy “capstone” documents as well, all seeking to refine the
balance among these issues, as well as addressing the now increasingly conspicuous views of the U.S.
Marine Corps, in the face of an evolving post-Cold War environment. That environment included rapid
globalization, unconventional threats abroad, changing American public attitudes, and a federal budget
climate uncongenial to significant fleet growth. Before being named CNO, while serving as NATO’s
Allied Joint Force Commander in Naples, Admiral Mullen realized that the Navy had to adopt – and
disseminate -- a new strategic approach, not based on power projection as had been the case throughout
the 1990s, but a broader approach that appreciated America’s changing role in the world and the unique
and vital contributions of the U.S. maritime services—Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. From that
realization came the effort to create A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.
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PANEL 3: NAVY FORCE DEVELOPMENT

TAILORING A NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE TO THE EMERGING FUTURE SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
Dr. Henry Hendrix II
Center for a New American Security

The panorama of history is replete with numerous great powers rising, making their mark upon the world
and then declining in the face of another rising power. The Egyptians gave way to the Assyrians, and the
Assyrians to the Babylonians etc. until the present day when the British Empire gave way to the Soviet
and American Cold War and ultimately to a moment of American uni-polarity unlike any other era in
history with the possible exception of the Romans. These cycles are well understood by those who
choose to look at them, but what is not understood is the technologies that lay behind these rise and fall
cycles throughout history.
Great powers tend to rise and persist due to a set of advantages. These might be a an aspect of
agrarian reform, or perhaps a system of governance that allows a great accrual of wealth, but rises are
almost always accompanied by a particular form of military technology that provides an advantage to the
nation who wields in upon the field of battle. The spear gave way to the bow and arrow. This
combination gave way to a bowman on a horse in mounted cavalry formations. The phalanx made its
debut and then was bested by the maniple formation. The longbow overcame French armor at Agincourt.
Sailing ships of the line gave way to steam and steel. Technology marches inexorably on, except where it
doesn’t, which is often in the great power that was responsible for introducing it.
Great powers who rise on a new technology are become beholden to it, often beyond its useful life.
Because new innovations come with a cost, be it economic or cultural, once a great power buys into a
new form of military technology, it becomes a sunk cost. Innovation would of necessity require
acknowledging that previous technologies had become obsolete and a decision to move in a new
direction. History suggests that such acts of agility rarely occure. What is more likely is that a Great
Power, having ridden a new technology to the top, will commit to that technology, perhaps even
expanding its investment in it. This has the effect of presenting a stable capabilities target for other
would be rising powers, allowing them to tailor a new capability that is focused on weaknesses inherit in
the current Great Power’s military capability, allowing the rising power to ultimately surpass the
reigning hegemon.
We see that today across all four of our DoD services. The Army and Air Force each continue to
invest in weapons that are evolutionary derivatives of platforms their predecessors in World War II
operated despite seven decades of technological progress. The Navy with its ten carrier strike group
awaiting orders to proceed to Point Luck prepares to fight the battle of Midway over again. The Marine
Corps, which gained a congressional mandate codified in law, maintains a “fleet marine force,” prepared
to perform an amphibious assault, with all the equipment necessary to perform that mission, despite the
fact that the mission has not been executed 65 years. In each of these cases, the United States military
has presented a stable target, evolving but not really changing, for rising powers to target.
The Army has increasingly packed more soldiers into tanks, armored personnel carriers, and
Humvees. Their enemy adapted armor piercing technologies and asymmetric tactics to kill and disable
Americans in their mobile formations. The Air Force found itself facing radars and missiles with
increasing range, maneuverability and lethality and responded by building a series of fighters and
bombers that were both increasingly difficult to find and increasingly expense to buy, necessitating a
decreasing force size that is unable to guarantee either air superiority or access to critical targets. The
Navy and Marine Corps similarly have invested in progressively more capable platforms that come with
added costs leading to a shrinking fleet and force even as the rest of the world invests in anti-access/area
denial weapons designed to hold American naval power projection off beyond its effective range. With
its inability to change, the American military has elected obsolescence.
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“So what are we to do?” service proponents might ask. Change is the answer. Divorcement from the
present reality, standing outside of the accepted paradigm and investing in change.
Recognize that in peace we do not need all high end capabilities to demonstrate American interest and
resolve. As the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower said, maintaining peace is at least as
important as winning the war. A large number of low capability frigates, perhaps 75-100 of them, are
required to service the 19 critical maritime regions of the globe. These frigates can provide maritime
security, build partnership capacity, and demonstrate the United States’ resolve. Critics might say that these
vessels would serve little to no role in a region spanning maritime war, such as that which was fought in
the Pacific during the 1941-45 era, and they would be correct. That is not the war we should fight.
If the United States were to go to war again it must leverage the technologies it has, a superb
intelligence-reconnaissance complex as well as a precision strike capability unlike any other nation on
earth, and combine these with newly emerging capabilities; unmanned and man-machine platforms,
directed energy weapons, electro-magnetic and hypersonics to identify, target and destroy the critical center
of gravity within the enemy camp. We should banish plans for a long campaign, attriting our way through
the enemy’s military, population, infrastructure and essential systems to reach the one that really matters,
its leadership. Should diplomacy and negotiations fail and circumstances warrant, then attacks on national
leadership at hypersonic velocities should be the American way of war.
Such attacks should come from increased numbers of nuclear submarines, perhaps a combination of
100 fast attack and guided missile submarines, as well as hypersonic cruise missile laden long range strike
bombers, and perhaps even from the decks of aircraft carriers, provided they rapidly integrate a long
ranged, unmanned strike aircraft, capable of spanning the 1500 mile standoff range imposed by recent
A2AD weapons.
If the United States does not break with its past and sunk infrastructure force constructs, it condemns
itself to a fate as a declining power. If, however, it embraces innovation, either under the label of a Third
Offset, or Air-Sea Battle or some other convenient bumper sticker, then it has a chance to revitalize its
leadership in the world and once again return to a position wherein it imposes costs upon its enemies, and
not the other way around. Such innovation requires bold leadership and clear vision, characteristics our
Navy once had in abundance and which I hope it still does.

22
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

PANEL 3: NAVY FORCE DEVELOPMENT

FIVE COSTS OF MILITARY INNOVATION
Ms. Lena S. Andrews, PhD Candidate and Ms. Julia MacDonald
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and George Washington University

Note: Originally appeared in War on the Rocks on February 18, 2016 at: http://warontherocks.com/2016/02/five-costs-ofmilitary-innovation/

Over the past year, the U.S. Department of Defense has engaged in an effort to reinvigorate the aging and
exhausted U.S. military by reassessing and reforming its strategic and tactical priorities. These reforms
are far-reaching in nature, ranging from the strategic pivot to Asia, to personnel reforms aimed at creating
a more adaptive “force of the future,” to investments in new, high-tech war-fighting platforms. A key
piece in this suite of changes, and the most significant from an operational standpoint, is DoD’s “third
offset strategy” — an initiative aimed in part at countering new anti-access area-denial (A2AD)
capabilities with a range of new technologies. And as the recent FY2017 budget rollout has illustrated,
this reform effort is starting to take shape.
The announcement of the third offset strategy has attracted much attention from within the defense
policy community, and has been heralded by many as necessary for the United States to maintain its
technological edge. And these efforts will no doubt result in significant benefits for the U.S. military. But
this emphasis on innovation is not without its risks, many of which might be overlooked, underestimated,
or even ignored in the excitement of a new defense initiative. Indeed, the tendency to equate technological
innovation with positive change — perhaps the result of publicized successes in the private sector — often
misses the myriad costs and challenges that accompany major overhauls of the kind announced by DoD.
A number of recent articles in WOTR’s Beyond Offset series have turned to U.S. history to highlight
some of the costs that accompanied previous offset strategies, and the challenges that might flow from
today’s efforts. In addition to revisiting these specific experiences, it may also be beneficial to take a step
back to map the landscape more broadly. This article aims to infuse the conversation about military
innovation with a realistic sense of the potential pitfalls to this endeavor, so these challenges can be better
understood, anticipated, and corrected as the United States develops its future force. Here we identify five
major costs to innovation that are important to acknowledge:
1. Effectiveness
Too often overlooked in conversations about innovation, both in the military and elsewhere, is the natural,
predictable, and sometimes crippling tradeoff between innovation and effectiveness. In the business
literature on innovation, this is often referred to as the explore-exploit dilemma. Put simply, organizations
which are good at “exploring” (i.e. innovating), tend to make significant sacrifices in “exploitation” (i.e.
everyday production and efficiency). In other words, the very things that make an organization good at
innovating — nonhierarchical structures, hands-off management techniques, nontraditional professional
development and rewards, etc. — can be liabilities when it comes to consistent execution. The holy grail
is thus to balance exploration and exploitation, a feat which only a handful of businesses can claim to
have achieved.
In the military, this challenge is doubly problematic. First, in a world of constrained resources,
innovation and change in one area can often undermine the military’s ability to deliver on other mission
sets. It should therefore come as little surprise that investments in the third offset may weaken our ability
to successfully carry out other missions, and this trade-off should explicitly be part of the discussion. For
example, after a decade of investing in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare capabilities, the
third offset may very well mean that these new skills are left to atrophy as resources move elsewhere.
Second, the explore-exploit tradeoff has costs that are far more consequential in the military than in
the private sector. For the private sector, the success and failure of innovation is measured in dollars. For
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the military, success and failure is measured in battlefield effectiveness and, sometimes, lives. Thus, while
investing in new technologies may leave Google or Amazon strapped for cash, the costs of shifting
investment priorities in the defense community are on a different scale entirely. We therefore need to
acknowledge and understand where innovation will make us stronger and where it will make us weaker,
so we can avoid sending our troops into situations where they are ill-equipped for the task at hand.
2. Vulnerability
Innovations are, by definition, new. This is precisely what makes them so exciting and effective —
especially in the military context where surprise can lead to significant battlefield gains.
But for all of the new capabilities that come with innovative technologies and doctrines, we often
forget the vulnerabilities that accompany new technologies. Take the Internet, for example. It enables us
to undertake crippling cyberattacks against our adversaries, but it also exposes the United States to
significant risk.
Similarly, while the push towards unmanned weaponry and greater automation in the defense sector
provides the U.S. military with unparalleled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and
strike capabilities at low risk to U.S. lives, the increased reliance on satellites required by these platforms
creates a new — and often underappreciated — set of challenges. As Jacquelyn Schneider notes, the
United States’ increasing reliance on cyber capabilities creates a “capability-vulnerability paradox.”
While U.S. investments in cyber-technologies might allow the military to conduct strikes further away
from the battlefield and with greater effectiveness, the increased dependence on satellite relay nodes,
intelligence infrastructure, and GPS communication create new opportunities for attack.
In short, new capabilities create new vulnerabilities, and we should not be too sanguine about the
risks attached to the high-tech advances envisaged by the third offset. This is especially so in a world
where interoperability challenges, jamming, cyberattacks, and counter-stealth technologies are a
persistent and growing threat.
3. Financial
As a purely practical matter, the financial costs of innovation should not be lost on the architects of these
reforms. After all, there is a reason why many start-ups fail — innovation can be capital- and timeintensive, and there is no guarantee that the product will ultimately prove viable when it makes it to the
market. For every successful innovation there are many ideas, prototypes, and alternatives that never make
it off of the cutting room floor. And even when they do, long time horizons means that costs can add up.
Those in the defense R&D and procurement communities know this fact all too well. Indeed, the cost
overruns associated with developing new military technologies have become par for the course in most
major U.S. military acquisitions of recent years, as the lack of truly competitive bidding and tendency
toward over-commitment have exploded acquisitions costs. But in addition to the standard reasons for the
overruns that often accompany defense acquisitions, the technologies of the third offset will likely involve
advanced, proprietary, and even covert technologies, all of which can result in a big price tag and offer
little guarantee of long-term utility.
As Stephen Rodriguez highlighted here at War on the Rocks, the last attempt at technological offset
came with some incredibly expensive budgetary causalities, and there is no reason to think this time will
be any different. To be fair, some leaders at DoD are well aware of the financial costs of the third offset,
and many will be mitigated by savings accrued from other, more successful innovations. Nevertheless, we
should not be naïve about the material costs that this initiative will require.
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4. Culture of Hierarchy
There are many reasons we should expect the military to resist major innovation. As James Q. Wilson
and Barry Posen have pointed out elsewhere: Organizations are created to minimize uncertainty, change
inherently introduces uncertainty, and thus we should not be surprised when organizations resist change.
Some of this resistance is unnecessary, and hamstrings the military when it attempts to introduce
valuable new technologies. However, it is important to remember that, perhaps more than any other
organization in the world, the military relies on a culture of order, discipline, and hierarchy —
formalized in the military chain of command — in order to perform its duties well. And so while
innovation may be critical in some areas of the military, the benefits of decentralized, independent
thinking must always be weighed against the risks of degrading the military hierarchy — a difficult
balance to strike for even the most modern militaries.
Of course, challenging hierarchy is not always bad, and innovation on the battlefield can also save
lives. Nevertheless, we should not overestimate the value of innovation at the expense of overlooking the
critical importance of hierarchy and structure to U.S. military effectiveness.
5. Strategic-Tactical
Perhaps the most understood risk of the innovations that will come with the defense reforms of recent
months is the risk of “putting the technology cart before the strategy horse,” as Jon Czarnekcki so pithily
put it. Indeed, the contributors at War on the Rocks have led the way in assessing how technological
innovation absent complementary strategic, doctrinal, and organizational change is both useless and
potentially counterproductive to political and national security ends. Technology can enable significant
war-fighting gains, but rarely does it induce revolutionary change alone. Military officials are well aware
of this, but their civilian bosses often need reminding that investments in technology must accompany
investments in training and exercises.
None of these warnings are meant to say that the military should avoid attempts at reform and
innovation. Indeed, it is precisely because the U.S. military has found ways to innovate that it has become
the most formidable military in the world. The reforms that will be undertaken by the defense community
in the coming years will undoubtedly lead to important and significant gains for the U.S. military. But to
ignore the risks associated with such an enterprise is analytically lazy and practically dangerous. Instead,
by acknowledging, understanding, and anticipating the risks of innovation, the United States will be better
placed to counteract these challenges, and better able meet future threats.
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PANEL 3: NAVY FORCE DEVELOPMENT

IMPACTS OF THE ROBOTICS AGE ON NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE PLANNING
Prof. Jeffrey E. Kline
Naval Postgraduate School

This discussion’s theme is that our overly platform-focused naval force structure planning and
acquisition system is burdened with so many inhibitors to change that we are ill-prepared to capitalize
on the missile and robotics age of warfare. Refocusing our efforts to emphasize the “right side” of an
offensive kill chain to deliver kinetic and non-kinetic effects will aid in overcoming these challenges
and prioritize our efforts towards identifying where cutting edge technologies can best be applied in
naval warfare. The dialog addresses traditional foundations for force structure planning, inhibitors to
changing force structure, and how focusing on the packages for platform delivery instead of the
platforms will allow us to better leverage new technologies.
Ideally, naval force structure grows from national strategy, national treasury, technology
advancement, and potential adversary capabilities to build required ships, aircraft and capabilities.
National strategy provides the rationale, purpose, and priority of choices to be made in creating a fleet.
National treasure provides both the resources and constraints. New technologies provide opportunities
for increasing fleet effectiveness, and may also potentially expose vulnerabilities to fleet survival when
adversary capabilities are considered. This is a complex problem with only these four factors. In reality,
however, U.S. force structure planning is also challenged by other influences, impactful on planning
and budgeting for the fleet’s composition. These other pressures inhibit capitalization of new
technologies and slow reaction in the face of new challenges.
The most powerful inhibitor is inertia caused by an existing fleet being a large national capital
investment with long build and life times. Ships and aircraft cost billions to design, build, and maintain.
They require a capital-intensive industry requiring heavy equipment, infrastructure, and a skilled
workforce, all generations in the making. The consequence is annual programming and budgeting
decisions are marginal in nature. It is the nature of a large fleet to evolve slowly, in lieu of
revolutionary changes to its composition.
Since our first six frigates were authorized in 1794, national internal political and economic factors
have been another major influence on fleet composition. Illustrated well by Ian Toll in his Six Frigates:
The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy, the potential windfalls on local economies when
selected to provide force structure generate powerful political pressures on force generation decisions
and create the desire for stabilization once those selections are made.
Next, over-compartmentalization in fleet planning, budgeting, building, and maintenance, with
large and resource-competing bureaucracies executing these functions, creates a lethargic and
inefficient environment for change. Multiple oversight agencies, including Congress, make any
decision by one program manager susceptible to over-zealous scrutiny which dis-incentivizes
innovation. Agility is lost when the number of stakeholders exceeds the point where responsibility and
authority cannot be clearly defined.
Finally, the very nature of a fleet’s strategic value engenders conservatism in senior naval
leadership when faced with options for change. This is not necessarily an unhealthy view as the loss of
the fleet can mean the loss of sea lines of communication and therefore a war. None-the-less, over
valuing what worked in the last major maritime war, at the expense of not recognizing technology that
changes the conveyance of maritime power, can result in a fleet not prepared to combat an enemy that
is not so inhibited.
None of these influences on force structure planning can be lightly dismissed. The danger is that
collectively they result in harmful escalation of commitment toward obsolete platforms and only
marginal changes in force structure in the face of major technological changes. The result today is a
brittle U.S. Fleet that is susceptible to capability surprise.
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The United States in not unique in facing these challenges. Historically, major changes to naval force
structure have resulted from war and/or great technology leaps. Ramming, row and boarding vessels gave
way to the naval cannon and sail; sail to steam; rifled gun and armor to aircraft; aircraft to missiles; and
now we are on the dawn of a robotics age. Missiles, robots, and artificial intelligence give the advantage
to smaller, many, faster, and more lethal offense capabilities. Our challenge is to not allow restraints on
the current force structure planning process to cede these advantages to potential adversaries.
Meeting the 2015 maritime strategic capabilities of all domain access, deterrence, sea control and
power projection, and maritime security while constrained by the budget and procurement process, and
contested by potential adversaries’ growing capabilities, will require new thinking in platforms, weapons,
and command and control. Advancement into the robotic age allows us to emphasize options to achieve a
desired tactical end state which enables our operational and strategic goals. For example, investing in a
very “smart” long range autonomous offensive missile that can out-range those of our adversary may
permit us to build less-expensive, less well-defended ships from which to launch them thereby making sea
control more affordable. Consider a new frigate with helicopter to hunt and armed with long-range missile
to kill against today’s DDG Flight III without any over-the-horizon missile. Granted, better to have a
DDG Flight III armed with the same long-range missile, so long as we can afford sufficient DDGs with
these capabilities to meet all of the other strategic capabilities around the world, the most capacitydemanding being maritime security. But our budget constrains us. The message here is not necessarily to
favor a frigate over a DDG, but to refocus our investments on less expensive “payloads” delivered, kinetic
or cyber, not the more expensive delivery platforms. A stark example is a weapon that has huge maritime
influence but no maritime platform, the DF-21. Focusing on offensive payloads also lessens many of the
political, economic, and bureaucratic challenges associated with large capital investment platform
programs. We are not there yet. In the FY17 DoD President’s budget, a bit over 40% of the budget is for
aircraft and ships, only 9% for munitions.
This “package focus” first is particularly applicable in the electromagnetic and cyber realm.
Inexpensive, deposable UAVs employing radar reflectors or chirp jamming may be better delivery
platforms for EM “packages” than an F-18 Growler. In the offense, developing “Left of kill chain” effects
against an adversary need not be expensive, but does require synchronization with the movement of actual
forces. The desired effects may rely as much on advisory perception as on physical outcomes. The
solutions here may be more organizational, training and in the area of concept of employment than force
structure additions.
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PANEL 3: NAVY FORCE DEVELOPMENT

RETHINKING THE NAVY’S STRATEGIC PRESUMPTIONS AND PLANNING PROCEDURES
Mr. Paul S. Giarra
Global Strategies & Transformation

A One-Ocean Navy?
Strategic planners should challenge the whittled down presumptions and planning of today's navy, which
likes to think of itself as a global navy but is headed for relevance in only one ocean. At that, if the AsiaPacific is the model for thinking about the one-ocean Navy, relevance is not necessarily going to be the
same as prevalence.
At best, with every innovative basing scheme and crew-swap program imaginable, current global
Navy deployment schedules will be hard pressed to keep more than a single battle group forward
deployed in any region in peacetime. This is more than a ship count issue, especially when it is fairly
obvious that the ship repair base can’t keep up even with this force structure when the schedule is
disrupted. Every shred of redundancy has been wrung out of the force and the support establishment,
apparently based upon presumptions of unchallenged deployments and no operational surges.
To make matters worse, it has been many decades since the U.S. Navy has been challenged as the
presumptive guarantor of freedom of the seas. Even ten years ago, there was not another regional navy to
challenge this rhetoric. Now, China, Russia, and soon Iran will challenge regionally at least. This rapid
threat emergence is reminiscent of the post-Cuban Missile Crisis rise of the Soviet Navy. Even if that
were not going to be true, there are many more key maritime straits and crossroads besides the South
China Sea that need to be vouchsafed -- from the Mediterranean to the Baltic to the Gulf of Aden -- than
the Navy has the force structure to cover. This warranty deficit is not lost on interested observers who
have a stake in the outcome on one side or the other.
We should not be willing to accept this regressive outcome as foreordained, not if it is true that as
goes the Navy, so goes the Nation. The Navy’s strategic presumptions and force planning procedures no
longer are adequate.
What Will War At Sea Look Like?
To make matters worse, war at sea is going to be quite different in terms of scope and scale than anything
being discussed publicly, which is an imperfect but useful gauge of what is being considered in the
classified process. There will be other differences that have to be sorted out, but this issue of scope and
scale refers to regional warfare that is going to be much, much more difficult and destructive than
anything generally being considered. Furthermore, regional naval warfare also will be very dependent
upon the ground components for support in places like China’s “Three Seas”, the Mediterranean, the
Baltic, the North Sea, and the Persian Gulf, while naval forces will have to be able to support the ground
component in turn.
Most important, the potential for escalation in maritime conflict is high because that is where our
forces will come together, and equally unacceptable: because in an age of generally unconstrained
nuclear, cyber, and space warfare, the civilizational risks of escalation are unthinkable. This means that
the U.S. navy is going to have to maintain a force structure that is in a forward-leaning operational
posture; with overbearing operational capabilities; and with dependable and robust command and control
and ISR sufficient to dominate escalation continuously.
The circumstantial backdrop of real war at sea makes the case for this conclusion. As one example, in
the Asia-Pacific this would be war against the Chinese Communist Party, which as the progenitor of
China’s emergence to challenge the status quo – in other words, the rules-based order that was established
after World War II but not buttressed since the end of the Cold War – has no room for compromise.
Conflict once started will be extremely difficult to control. Second, the maritime democracies are going to
have to contend at a minimum with the Three Navies – China, Russia, and Iran – which may not always
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operate in close coordination but which will split defenses and at a minimum seriously challenge
resources. Third, Navy operational presumptions regarding connectivity and reach may not hold in the
face of cyber attacks; precision guided munitions and the missile-enabled loss of air control; and standoff
defenses.
This is a Job for the CNO, Not for the COCOMS or the Joint Staff
These are problems with national and global implications, but it is going to have to be the Navy, in the
person of the CNO and not some remote staff in the hinterlands or the wilderness of the Pentagon, that is
going to have to sort out an escalation dominance strategy or something like it; derive the operational
requirements; articulate the strategy to the White House, the Congress, and the public; argue for the
necessary resources; and get the fleet ready.
So far, this is aspirational. Congressman Randy Forbes referred to this “deficit of strategic thinking”
in a letter to CNO Greenert.
Congressman Forbes’s central point in his letter was that technology, programs, and force structure
were driving strategy, instead of the other way around:
It makes eminent sense to start with the Maritime Strategy, developed by the Chief of Naval
Operations, but in recent years we seem to have turned ourselves upside down by increasingly
emphasizing programs and force structure rather than starting with a strategy based on what we need
naval forces to do and in what scenarios.
“What’s the Answer” vs. “What is the Question”
The congressman has put his finger on a central issue. We have put a tremendous amount of energy into
trying to derive the answer, rather than asking, “What are the right questions?” This “answer first”
approach shows clearly in the Navy’s current vernacular debates over LCS and carriers, for instance, and
in the contretemps over integrating unmanned aircraft into carrier air wings.
A more appropriate starting point might be to determine the Navy’s strategic purpose going forward,
and in what context; and then derive the force structure, force levels, and capabilities necessary to get the
job done. This approach, however, challenges the entire Pentagon planning structure based upon program
continuity and programmatic defense of resources, “no matter what.”
To the contrary, however, the commanders who win will be those who held decisive control decades
before the war starts, and who anticipated strategy, tactics, and technological trends.1 Otherwise, without
the right presumptions, whatever resources are available will be squandered.
The Second Offset Strategy as an example
The Second Offset Strategy process is one good example of how to approach such a vital problem. It
grew out of the mid-1970s ARPA/DNA Long Range Research & Development Planning Program
(LR2DP2), which convened three key panels consisting of government and industry experts. The program
had the benefit of experienced analytical contractors and panel members with the background in
sophisticated military equipment development critical to identifying solutions capable of providing
practical operational capability. The three panels were: the Alternatives Panel; the Advanced Technology
Panel; and the Munitions Panel.2
The programs and capabilities that originated in the [second] offset strategy, many of which were not
fielded until the late 1980s and early 1990s, revolutionized conventional warfare, assured American
dominance in large-scale ground combat, and eventually drove potential adversaries to “design around”
American conventional superiority by employing asymmetric advantages. The offset strategy evolved
1
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concurrently with doctrine – which came to favor rapid, decisive operations to quickly defeat adversaries
– but also largely ignored urban operations and counterinsurgency missions.
The offset strategy led to major improvements in stealth, precision strike, battlefield information and
communications systems, intelligence systems, positioning and navigation capabilities, and training.
Innovation in each of these areas was focused on a single strategic objective: offsetting the Warsaw Pact’s
conventional superiority in Europe, and lowering NATO’s reliance on nuclear weapons to deter – or in
time of war defend against – a Soviet attack.3
A key aspect of this successful approach was that DoD brought together into the same room a select
group of operators, analysts, engineers, and industrialists. Furthermore, they had the advantage of having
a clear strategy to which they could refer.
The purpose of the overall LR2DP2 effort was to assess, in as systematic a manner as practicable,
what possible shifts or emphasis in the U.S. Defense R&D program were implied by the strategy of
Flexible Response that has been set forth by former President Nixon and secretary of Defense
Schlesinger. The overall approach was to investigate representative conflict scenarios that come under the
general heading of “Limited Soviet Aggression.”4
Net Assessment as an Example
A similar procedural approach is the Net Assessment process of carefully correlated data-driven
comparisons in areas of military competition that identify overlaps where comparative advantage can be
leveraged or banked; and underlaps, wherein risks can be redressed or accepted and factored into
strategies and plans. In this contemporary process, Net Assessment Director Andrew Marshall raised to a
high art getting the right people in the room and asking them the right questions.
The Relationship Between Strategy and Technology/Force Structure
This right-minded capabilities derivation process is an example of what Possony and Pournelle refer to as
“technology war”. There is no argument regarding the power of American technology, only that strategy
should come first. If strategy were to come first – and Congressman Forbes has flagged for us that it does
not – then strategic presumptions and planning procedures would be quite different, and so would our
conversations about force development and technology. As Possony and Pournelle point out,
As we have repeatedly stated, the Technological War must be fought as are other wars; that is, it must
be fought according to a strategy. A military general who simply muddles through, overcoming each
obstacle as it comes to him, fighting battles at the dictation of the enemy, and preparing only for battles
already fought, would soon lose the war. Yet, too often it is thought that the technological War, which
may be the moist decisive engagement in the history of mankind, can be fought with precisely this
technique. Technology is made the driving force, dictating to strategy; and strategy is conceived of as the
employment of systems already created by the technologists, that is, strategy is confined to operational
decisions. This is akin to allowing the munitions manufacturer to decide the conduct of the war.5
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PANEL 4: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY

THE SUITABILITY OF GRAND STRATEGY FOR TODAY
Dr. Lukas Milevski
Changing Character of War Programme, Oxford University

This paper deals not with maritime strategy and security directly, but rather with one of its progeny concepts—
grand strategy, an important contextual idea for sea power. Grand strategy in a recognizably modern form was
first implied and developed by maritime thinkers such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Stafford Corbett,
specifically because the maritime sphere enabled non-military instruments to have utility in a way which could
not be the case in western Europe. As Mahan argued, “[t]he diplomatist, as a rule, only affixes the seal of treaty
to the work done by the successful soldier. It is not so with a large proportion of strategic points upon the sea.”1
The influence of maritime strategy broadened grand strategy—a pre-existing term—from being purely a
military concept to one with far-reaching responsibilities with the addition of non-military instruments. Yet,
unlike the amorphous notions of grand strategy which were to come later in the twentieth century and whose
value is arguable, this first broadened notion of grand strategy remained fixed on war and adversarial
relationships between polities.2 The focus of an inquiry into the suitability of grand strategy for today will focus
on the utility of non-military instruments as independent executors of policy within adversarial relationships.
Implied by the broadened formulation of grand strategy as the employment of both military and nonmilitary instruments for political purposes is the notion that military and non-military means obey the same
logic and are equal in value and utility. This is not the case. Military power has the capacity to impose and
control. This is most forcefully realized through land power, but less so with sea power, air power, and cyber
power. These latter forms of military power may take control solely in their own domains but can only deny
control in the wider context of the conflict as a whole.3 Denial of control through military force is, of all
military power, most similar in logic to that of the non-military instruments. Yet in general, military power
has the capability to impose upon the enemy an ultimate situation in which the adversary must make a
choice either for peace or for the continuation of war. This reverses Lawrence Freedman’s revision of the
wars of necessity versus wars of choice distinction, changing it instead to obligatory versus voluntary
decisions about war.4
The logic of non-military power differs substantially. “Coercive diplomacy needs to be distinguished from
pure coercion. It seeks to persuade the opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into
stopping. In contrast to the crude use of force to repel the opponent, coercive diplomacy emphasizes the use of
threats and the exemplary use of limited force to persuade him to back down.”5 Thus non-military power
cannot take control, instead being a collection of instruments whose purpose is pure denial. The particular
character of this denial depends on the specific non-military instrument employed. Denial through economic
sanctions differs in its effect from information dominance and propaganda, which differs from diplomatic
pressure, etc.
This denial of control is represented by the bloodless trends, which are interpreted through trends
analysis and may require very long periods of time to manifest. Iran, for instance, had been under economic
sanctions of ever-increasing pressure since 1995, a whole generation ago. It is possible to imagine the
logical endpoint of a policy of economic sanctions to be, for example, the destruction of the citizenry of a
nation unable to import the necessary food. Few sanctioning countries, however, would be willing to push
their policies so far. Few policy-makers relish the notion of imposing a public, slow-motion massacre of
innocents across an entire state. Thus most decisions made under non-military duress are usually voluntary
rather than necessary.
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The utility of both military and non-military power is necessarily contextual—to the manner in which it is
employed, to the particular character and characteristics of the opponent, etc. Both military and non-military
instruments are difficult to employ with the desired degree of success, and use of the military is not a panacea,
as the American strategic experience of the past fifteen years only too readily testifies. Yet of the two, nonmilitary power is arguably more susceptible to going awry due to context than is military force, because it
cannot compel a polity in the same way that the military can. Non-military power must rely upon the
opponent’s own perceptions of his situation.
Thus, the sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s did not work. Relative to the policy goals the United States
sought—Saddam Hussein’s ouster and the termination of his WMD program—sanctions simply could not
supply the required duress.6 Similarly, Russia’s political use of its energy dominance in Europe, particularly
eastern Europe, has had mixed results and often failed to alter the policies of even weak neighbors.7 Thus far,
the West’s sanctions on Russia, even when combined with the much more significant collapse in the price of
oil, have not yet triggered the desired change in Russia’s foreign policy behavior, nor even in the behavior of
Russia’s proxies in the Donbas. With regards to the sanctions against Russia, however, it is notable that the
West has not cut off Russian access to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
(SWIFT), an act which ultimately brought Iran to the negotiating table after 2013.8
Why is it that non-military instruments, having been first introduced into strategic theory at the end of the
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries (in broader historical terms, not so long ago), seem to be
losing their apparent utility—albeit not their popularity? It is the context that has greatly changed from just
over a century ago. When Mahan and Corbett wrote, the context in which they wrote and of which they wrote
was peripheral but imperial. That is, maritime strategy could only be practiced on the edges of the European
continent and across the expanses of sea between Europe and the myriad imperial possessions of European
powers. Imperial possessions were rarely considered to be intrinsically important either as territory or for
political consequences in Europe itself. Portions of empires could be traded or bartered in a manner unlikely to
occur within Europe and there were few to gainsay such transactions, even in adversarial relationships.
Today, the old empires are mostly gone, replaced by successor states, many of which are nations.
National states mean national territory and national policies. Many are ruled by authoritarian figures, some
of whom rely upon national feeling to buttress their rule or their own popularity—such as Putin today. To
surrender national territory or change national policies under duress, whether military or non-military,
within an adversarial relationship would be deeply unpopular. It might spell the end of one’s government,
of the regime, perhaps even of the authoritarian figure’s life should he be unlucky. Military force is
generically more useful than non-military power because the necessity of obliging the enemy to make a
decision is often required.
Yet this context remains largely unrecognized in the West, for whom non-military instruments are usually
the first—and often only—one to be employed in a confrontation. This may be because, even as the world
remains national and political, many states in the West are focusing increasingly on the market and on making
money, particularly in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Such market-states are “largely indifferent to the
norms of justice, or for that matter to any particular set of moral values so long as law does not act as an
impediment to economic competition.” 9 This emphasis persuades Western political leaders to value nonmilitary power above its real worth to effect actual change, because this is the set of instruments which seems
best suited to applying pressure on Western powers.
The notion of grand strategy as the use for political purposes of all instruments, both military and nonmilitary, requires revision if it is to be relevant today. Non-military instruments in particular appear to have lost
utility as direct and independent executors of policy, but there are other ways in which they may be used to
beneficial effect even in adversarial relationships and war.
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PANEL 4: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY

COMPUTATIONAL APPROACHES TO STRATEGIC REASONING: MARITIME STRATEGY
AND BEYOND
Mr. Adam Elkus
PhD student, George Mason University

The emergence of cyber conflict, robotics, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems as either
current or future elements of conflict pose significant issues for the craft of strategy. 1 Many believe that
emerging information technology platforms – in challenging the very fundamentals of human
decisionmaking and control over the rationalization of violence – will be a decisive break from all that we
know. Those tasked with maritime strategy in particular must deal with the challenge of integrating
unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned sea vehicles into strategies and concepts of operation. 2
However, the biggest challenge that the Navy and other entities face lies in thinking about strategy
and decision from a computational point of view. A world in which the power of computation is
increasingly inescapable needs analysts to draw broader connections between computation and existing
strategic theory and history rather than merely building strategic analysis and concepts around whatever
technological tools temporarily rule the day.
Hence, this paper argues for the utility of a computational approach to strategic reasoning. A
computational approach takes familiar aspects of strategy and recasts them in terms of computational
processes such as algorithms and programs for search, learning, and optimization. A computational
approach also allows strategic analysis and explanation to be formalized and implemented as a computer
program on a standard desktop computer or laptop.
Most importantly, computational approaches begin from a recognition of shared human and machine
limitations on strategy and decision. Rationality – bounded or not – does not entail omniscience, and a
computational approach promotes a view of strategy as an adaptive means of fulfilling goals in spite of
them. 3 Understanding both commonalities and differences in human and machine views of strategy and
adversarial behavior will not only shed light on current strategic challenges but also contribute to broader
knowledge and understanding in strategic theory. 4
The paper provides a basic proof of concept by showing how aspects of Cold War strategy –
including maritime strategy and operations – may be simulated through a multi-agent model of nuclear
conflict. The commercial nuclear strategy game of DEFCON presents a simple Cold War simulation
where players – unaware of each other’s dispositions – place ground units and naval fleets and then
progress from surveilling each other’s dispositions to progressively more escalatory levels of combat.
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Every game culminates in total nuclear exchange. Via an application programming interface (API) written
in the programming language C++, modelers can program computer players to play automated matches.
While DEFCON is in many ways a very unrealistic depiction of nuclear war, programming automated
players to fight each other reveals the most important finding of the computational approach. All systems
– from slime molds to states – are limited in time and space in the amount of choices that can be
considered and must resolve tradeoffs in goals and behaviors. All entities are capable of improving their
performance through adaptation and learning, but face similar limitations and tradeoffs in what can be
learned and how it is learned. 5 Programming strategy game players similarly involves tradeoffs between
different goal-driven strategic behaviors and reactionary responses to unexpected events.
The similarities and difference between human and machine strategy game players is often
instructive; the former often internalize ways to compress or abstract the game in ways that the latter do
not. What both have in common, however, is the reality of constraints, limitations, and tradeoffs in how
they decide what to do next. Herbert Simon’s concept of “bounded rationality” – often popularly
understood as cognitive and human limits on reasoning and optimal decision – actually may have
originally been used to describe the process of deriving approximations for military operations and
logistics problems that were too tough to compute exact solutions for in the early Cold War. 6
Computational models and simulations have often been used for operations research and analysis,
wargaming, and simulation and training. In general, however, computational models are rarely if ever
utilized for theory development and abstract strategic reasoning. In sum, despite the problematic Cold
War origins of computational approaches, this paper suggests that the real utility of computer programs
that model strategic problems is theory development and contribution to the collective knowledge base of
the strategy community.
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PANEL 4: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MARITIME STRATEGY

CONTINUING CONTROL: STRATEGIC REASONING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
Mr. Nicholas C. Prime
PhD candidate, King’s College London

In the summer of 1950 Captain Joseph ‘J.C.’ Wylie returned to Newport to begin a staff tour at the
Naval War College. Over the course of his three-year tour Wylie developed and oversaw the short-lived
‘Advanced Course in Strategy and Sea Power.’ While the course was canceled less than three years
after his departure, it ultimately resulted in a unique body of scholarship on strategic theory. Along
with Wylie, and his students, Rear Admiral Henry Eccles and German-American historian Dr. Herbert
Rosinski would collectively develop what I refer to as the ‘Control School’ of strategy. The defining
feature of which would be a straightforward idea: the purpose of all war, and by extension the aim of
any strategy, is the assertion of some desired degree of ‘control’ over the adversary. Expanding outward
from this basic premise, each of these three intellectuals worked toward the development of a
comprehensive theory of war and strategy that, while now largely forgotten, can improve the way we
conceptualize and communicate strategy today.
‘Strategic Reasoning’
Herbert Rosinski began his study of strategy by exploring the canonical works of Clausewitz, Mahan,
Corbett, and others; the intention of which was to reconcile the different patterns of thought that
become apparent when one looks at strategy on land and strategy at sea. Through the course of his
years of study Rosinski’s aim evolved. He came to believe that what was needed was the development
of a comprehensive theory of strategy. Thoroughly Clausewitzian in his thinking, Rosinski sought to
achieve one of Clausewitz great aims: to reconcile the nature and character of past wars with those that
clearly marked the turn to a new historical epoch. He believed that the end of the Second World War,
the maturation of the industrial age, and the dawn of the atomic age, meant that both war and society
had entered a new historical epoch. Just as the rise of Napoleon’s France had inspired Clausewitz
attempt to rationalise war as it was, with war as it had been throughout (pre-Napoleonic) history. As
Rosinski explained:
Today, with our field of strategy so enormously enlarged and our notions of it so
grievously split between three widely irreconcilable service views – not to mention
others – the need for a common theory as at least the basis for a meaningful discussion
of the existing divergences has become incomparably more imperative than in
Clausewitz’ days. I do not see how we can ever hope to arrive at any unified, rational
and economic, national strategy except upon the basis of a previously established
theory of war.1
In light of the maturity of the industrial age and the dawn of the nuclear age, Clausewitz definition
of strategy as the “use of an engagement for the purpose of the war” was no longer fit for purpose.2 To
Rosinski, a comprehensive theory had to unify this out-dated definition with what Rosinski viewed as
the other conception of strategy hinted at, but not fully developed in On War: “strategy as the overall
direction of war”.3 This idea of two realms of strategy had already been explored by Julian Corbett. The
British navalist referred to them as ‘Minor Strategy’ and ‘Major Strategy’, what many today would
term ‘strategy’ and ‘grand strategy’.4
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The great value of a comprehensive theory, one inclusive enough to cover the comprehensive
direction of a nations power (both military and non-military), is in its ability to provide the foundation
for what Rosinski called ‘strategic reasoning’. Strategic reasoning, he suggested, was an analytical
methodology that needed to be taught. It was analogous to the ways in which law schools do more than
teach legal cases, they teach law students to think like lawyers, legal reasoning; likewise, medical
schools teach more than specific medical cases they teach a broader conception of medical reasoning.
The means to approach, analyse, and most importantly, communicate about strategy with others across
the various services and organizations, through an explicit theory, was “imperative in order to provide
common ground for a discussion and to avoid semantic misunderstandings.”5
‘Strategy as Control’
This idea of a comprehensive theory of strategy as a form of strategic reasoning is the framework
through which the work of Wylie, Rosinski, and Henry Eccles should be viewed. It was Wylie who first
presented the idea that “the aim of any war is to establish some measure of control over the enemy. The
pattern of action by which this control is sought is the strategy of the war.”6 Rosinski, while defining
strategy as the “comprehensive direction of power”, shared Wylie’s emphasis on control, declaring it
“the essence of strategy; control being the element which differentiates true strategic action from a
haphazard series of improvisations.”7
While Rosinski, the consummate scholar, defined the practice of strategy as the “coordination of all
forces and resources of a community in such a clear and purposeful manner as to: make effective action
possible, and to maximize the effectiveness of this action.” 8 Wylie, ever the operator, directed his
writings quite pointedly towards the thinking and practice of the operator.
The primary aim of the strategist in the conduct of war is some selected degree of control
of the enemy for the strategist’s own purpose; this is achieved by control of the pattern of
war; and this control of the pattern of war is had by manipulation of the center of gravity
of war to the advantage of the strategist and the disadvantage of the opponent.9
It is the specific focus on control, and its explicit distinction from – and relationship to – destruction,
which most distinguishes it from Clausewitz, and the majority of land-centric strategic theory. Though
this is not to say that their work stands opposed to that of Clausewitz, or even the central role of the
soldier to strategy, Wylie was quite specific in insisting that the soldier on land was the ultimate
manifestation of the concept.
The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun. This man is the
final power in war. He is control. He determines who wins. There are those who would
dispute this as an absolute, but it is my belief that while other means may critically
influence war today, after whatever devastation and destruction may be inflicted on an
enemy, if the strategist is forced to strive for final and ultimate control, he must
establish, or must present as an inevitable prospect, a man on the scene with a gun. This
is the soldier. […] I do not claim that the soldier actually on the scene is a requisite in
every case; but I do believe he must be potentially available, and clearly seen as
potentially available, for use as the ultimate arbiter. 10
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This statement, in essence reflects Clausewitz own assertion that the aim of war is the destruction of
the enemy forces, so as to impose one’s will upon them.11 Yet it also builds on that assertion by hinting
at the fact that goals can be achieved without complete destruction, and without this “ultimate arbiter.”
The critical distinction that Wylie makes is the one between destruction as the end unto itself, and as a
means to serve the desired ends: the establishment of control. Clausewitz discusses this, at the very
opening of On War, in the sense of “imposing our will upon the enemy” (which, in essence, is how he
views control). However, he follows that with the assertion that to “render the enemy powerless”, to
destroy his means of resistance, is the “true aim of war.”12 This distinction as expressed by Clausewitz,
has, according to Wylie, Rosinski, and Eccles, all too often led strategists to assume the destruction of the
enemy army is the ultimate objective of the war, without appreciating what precisely the strategist wishes
to impose upon his enemy.13 A focus on control, they argue, provides the ability to properly calibrate the
type and degree of destruction required. Absent this calibration, unchecked destruction becomes counterproductive. In discussing the contribution of both the sailor, and the soldier, Wylie argues:
Destruction in each of these two cases is only one component of control, and not the
whole of it. The soldier exercises ultimate control by his unchallenged presence on the
scene. The sailor contributes to control in part by destruction, but as much by other
components. Like the soldier, in some cases, by his presence. Or, as often as not, by
making possible various political or economic pressures toward control.14
The explicit argument, expressed most cogently by Wylie but echoed in the writing of both Rosinski
and Eccles, is that while the ultimate form of control is the unchallenged presence of “the man on the
scene with the gun”, it should not be assumed that this is required in all, or perhaps even most,
instances.15 This is, instead, a zero-point baseline and it is equally if not more likely that the degree
required (or the degree that is realistically achievable) will be a deviation from this baseline.
The central requirement of the strategist then, is to discern what specifically is the degree of control
required. Rosinski draws this issue back to the foundational principal of On War: the relationship of war
to policy. 16 In essence he upholds the authority of policy over military leadership, with two critical
caveats. The first being that political leadership must understand the nature and effect of the “tools” it is
employing, its pre-conditions and possible consequences. The second, stemming from the first, is that
policy must not ask of military leadership efforts which they are patently incapable of achieving.17
‘Continuing Control’
In developing what Rosinski had referred to as ‘comprehensive control’, which is to say control as the
focusing concept that governs, and gives purpose to, the overall direction of war and the coordination of
all forces and resources of the community, Eccles provided what may be a more useful conception in
‘continuing control’. Like Wylie, Eccles was concerned with the tendency of strategists, both in abstract
theorizing and war planning, to focus overwhelmingly on destruction as an end unto itself. This
manifested in what he referred to as ‘weapons strategies’, those that reflexively tend to hone in on a
specific weapon or system of weapons (belonging either to the strategist or the adversary).18 The result of
this, Eccles argued, is that the strategist tends to pattern his thinking to the capability of the weapon,
rather than maintaining an agnostic appreciation of the dictates of policy. For Eccles, the benefit of
phrasing this concept was ‘continuing control’ was that it, “naturally leads to a re-examination and better
11

Clausewitz, On War, Book VIII, Chapter IV
Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter I
13
Wylie, Military Strategy, p. 47
14
Wylie, Military Strategy, p. 88
15
Wylie, Military Strategy, p. 72
16
Herbert Rosinski, ‘The Structure of Military Strategy’ (November, 1956), pp. 7-9
17
Rosinski, ‘The Structure of Military Strategy’ (November, 1956), pp. 8-9
18
See Henry Eccles comments on: Herbert Rosinski, ‘New Thoughts on Strategy’ (September 1955)
12

37
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

understanding of the objectives whose attainment is the purpose of the attempt to exercise control.”
Eccles went on to suggest that:
The concept of continuing control prepares the mind for shifting its emphasis from
weapon to weapon or from tool to tool in accordance with a changing situation or with
the changing capabilities and use or application of the weapons or weapon systems
involved. Thus, [Rosinski’s concept of strategy as “comprehensive control”] naturally
leads to the intellectual concept of flexibility.19
Eccles conception here is, by his own admission, deliberately simplified and capable of considerable
expansion. Given his emphasis on flexibility as this central principal, a sort of governing virtue of
strategic thinking, both the concept and wording should be viewed in a broad light.20 Like Rosinski,
Eccles intended to develop a comprehensive theory that applied up and down the various levels of war
and across the various domains of war. To that end, his call for flexibility in the use or application of
weapons and weapons systems, I would argue, should be viewed not just within the case of a specific
service. It should be viewed instead, as speaking to the flexible way in which the services themselves are
brought to bear in the execution of a given strategy.
Keeping in mind Rosinski’s argument that the theory of control functions both as a field strategy, and
in the sense of strategy as the overall direction of war, this idea should be applied at both levels. The idea
of employing weapons and weapons systems towards continuing control at the level of a field strategy
should, at the level of overall direction, be viewed as the flexible application of the service’s roles,
missions, and specific weapons systems. Therefore this should be read in the sense of what we today call
“joint warfighting”.
The theory of control, I believe, is both sufficiently broad and coherent to serve as a means of
strategic reasoning in an era where the conduct of war is highly complex. Complex not only in terms of its
organisational challenges from inter-service, to inter-agency, and multi-national; but also the challenges
of its conduct from insurgency, to operational-access, to conventional, and even so called ‘Phase 0’ or
’Gray Wars’. All of which can be understood and discussed in terms of their central essence: the assertion
or denial of some degree of control. It is because of this that the theory of control provides a sound basis
for strategic reasoning, one capable of improving the way we approach, analyse and communicate
strategic understanding across a range of domains, services, and organizational structures.
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PANEL 5: MARITIME WARFARE

“VIRTUAL ATTRITION” AND VICTORY IN MARITIME WARFARE
Mr. Bryan Clark
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

The proliferation of “anti-access” threats such as submarines, anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, and
long-range surveillance systems is today the overriding preoccupation of those who develop maritime
strategy, build naval weapons, and organize, train, and equip the fleet. The concepts these communities
pursue rely to a great degree on destroying or killing the enemy and its weapons. This decisive and logical
approach, however, is not a sustainable one against today’s threats and may actually detract from naval
forces achieving their objectives. Instead, maritime forces may be better served if they simply avoid
threats, impose costs on their adversaries, and accomplish the task at hand.
An enemy force can be taken out of the fight in two main ways. It can be destroyed or killed, which
could be called “actual attrition,” or it can be marginalized or rendered ineffective, which could be called
“virtual attrition.” The former requires enemy targets be found and classified precisely, and engaged with
a weapon able to locate the target and overcome target countermeasures and maneuvers. This sets a pretty
high bar for reconnaissance and command and control capabilities, weapon seekers, and weapon guidance
and control systems.
In contrast, virtual attrition may be achievable with a much less expensive and sophisticated set of
capabilities. Offensively, it involves friendly forces suppressing enemy operations until the enemy’s
window of opportunity to conduct them passes. Defensively, virtual attrition can be achieved by
compelling the enemy to conduct many more attacks than are necessary because of friendly force
disposition, or due to providing the enemy a false of degraded targeting information.
Some historical examples
The Allies success in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) during the Battle of the Atlantic is an excellent
example of virtual attrition in action. In the first year of World War II, less than a dozen Axis submarines
were on patrol at any given time in the Atlantic Ocean. Despite their small numbers, they imposed
hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping losses on the Allies attempting to resupply England. These
losses grew only modestly as the number of Axis submarines on patrol grew to more than 100 in 1941,
indicating less productivity per submarine. And starting in mid-1942, overall shipping losses per month
actually decreased, with a few spikes due to specific operational situations. Submarine losses, however,
were less than about 10 per month throughout the battle until late 1944. Something other than submarine
losses was causing the U-boat offensive to falter.
That something else was virtual attrition. Allied ASW efforts, while not resulting in many submarine
kills, were preventing submarines from getting into position for an effective attack. When they missed
their window of opportunity, U-boats were marginalized from the fight until another convoy came along,
and the process would repeat. This dynamic took advantage of a submarine’s limited speed, self defenses,
and sensor capability. Notably, submarines today still have these limitations relative to the surface ships
and aircraft arrayed against them.
Another example is in air defense, although ashore rather than at sea. During the Vietnam War, North
Vietnamese troops imposed virtual attrition on attacking U.S. aircraft with the introduction of the SA-2 air
defense system. This surface-to-air missile system was provided by the Soviet Union and made
operational by the time of Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965. Previous to the SA-2’s introduction, U.S.
strike aircraft only had to worry about anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) (sometimes radar-guided) and MiG
interceptor aircraft. Those were negated by flying above the range of AAA guns and bringing fighter
escorts to counter the MiGs.
The SA-2 added a new set of threats. It could engage aircraft above the altitude of AAA, taking away
the sanctuary American aircraft had enjoyed above 10,000 feet. It was also guided by the ground-based
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radar all the way to the target, making chaff and flares launched by the target aircraft less effective. Even
though the first generation of SA-2’s had a less than 10 percent probability of killing an aircraft, U.S. air
forces had to respect the threat it posed. As a result, by the end of Operation Rolling Thunder in 1968,
half the aircraft in U.S. strike packages were devoted to electronic warfare and defensive counterair
missions. Most of these aircraft were converted fighters or fighter-bombers, so the SA-2 was able to
essentially reduce the number of strike aircraft in U.S. air forces by one-half.
Implications for future warfare
There are several ways U.S. forces could exploit virtual attrition in future conflicts. For example, the antiaccess networks of potential U.S. adversaries such as China or Russia depend on “reconnaissance strike
complexes” consisting of surveillance systems and long-range precision guided weapons. Because they
depend on “fire and forget” capabilities, these complexes are vulnerable to counter-targeting operations
such as electronic warfare, concealment, decoy, and deception. These efforts will compel the enemy to
use more weapons than desired as they attack false targets, attempt to overwhelm jammers, and launch
multiple weapon at targets with large areas of uncertainty.
Enemy reconnaissance strike complexes are also susceptible to suppression attacks by U.S. and allied
forces. Missile launchers, including those on ships and aircraft, make themselves vulnerable to
counterattack when they conduct launch operations. Rapid counterbattery attacks by U.S. naval forces
could prevent these launchers from preparing for another engagement, even if they do not destroy or
damage the launcher. Once discovered, launchers can then be harassed such that they are unable to sustain
significant fires.
A particularly naval example of suppression attacks is in ASW. As in World War II, U.S. surface and
air forces today could significantly reduce the effectiveness of enemy submarines by using overt ASW
sensors, such as low frequency active sonar, and inexpensive standoff weapons such as anti-submarine
rockets. Overt sensors will make submarine commanders less willing to approach the area in which the
sensor is operating, out of concern for being detected. And being attacked with a standoff ASW weapon,
even if unsuccessful, will cause a submarine to leave the area because is confirms the submarine was
detected by ASW forces, and the submarine lacks the speed and self defense capabilities to “stand and
fight” as a surface combatant might.
These new concepts could enable naval forces to reduce the ability of the enemy to be effective
without actually attriting its forces. Instead, these efforts marginalize the enemy and remove them
temporarily from the fight. Other examples will be explored in the presentation as well, but in general this
approach offers the potential to improve naval warfighting by focusing capability development on those
operations that actually accomplish objectives, rather than simply kill the enemy.

40
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

PANEL 5: MARITIME WARFARE

COMMANDING TOMORROW’S CONTESTED ZONE: OPERATIONALIZING CS21
IN THE LITTORALS
Dr. Francis G. Hoffman
National Defense University

This short paper will focus on the strategic importance of the littorals, a topic frequently overlooked.
Instead, too often the global commons is accorded strategic status and overemphasized. Command of the
global commons, is a key enabling element of our larger national strategy. It is important to be able to
gain control where and when needed, and it should be a critical mission for maritime forces.1 But this use
of the sea, space, and air is NOT the end game of our strategy––it is simply an enabler to achieve larger
strategic objectives in maintaining international order and access to allies, partners and critical resources.
Once opened, we must leverage our control of the commons to achieve assigned objectives in the risky
littorals and the complex terrain and urbanized political centers where political power and centers of
gravity will congregate. This is where the back half of the A2/AD challenge is too often overlooked.
Countering the area denial threat is already here and also a growing challenge, in a world in which cheap
but lethally effective counters can proliferate even faster and much cheaper than modern, long-range antiaccess technologies. It is not an end unto itself, despite thinly veiled attempts to portray it as such.2
While we need to secure control of those commons when we need to, reflecting our Mahanian roots,
we should not lose sight of the Corbettian notion of exploiting that access for strategic and operational
maneuver in the Contested Zones.3 These zones include the complex and congested littorals where the
majority of the world’s population, economic activity, energy distribution networks and political power is
centered.4 The requirement to maneuver over the global commons and into these littoral environments has
been and remains the real extant challenge for U.S. military strategy. Our Nation accrues a number of
strategic advantages from its relatively robust amphibious projection capacity.5 At the end of the day, we
must ensure our adversaries are not granted impunity in the contested zones where their area denial
systems and exploitation of the dense complex terrain of the littoral environment presents challenges at the
operational level in ground expeditionary operations.
I was asked to apply my research on adaptation to the challenge of preparing for littoral warfare. In
order to satisfy the chair’s direction, I arranged my presentation in four parts. In the first section, I will
define and then redefine what is meant today by adaptation. I will then briefly discuss the foundational
attributes of the U.S. Marine Corps, which I consign responsibility for its remarkable degree of
adaptability. In the third portion, the paper transitions to a discussion about the adaptations made by the
Marine Corps represented in the concepts of Operational Maneuver from the Sea and Distributed
Operations. In my final section, I delineate a few areas where the Corps can continue to adapt in order
achieve the requisite capabilities for the United States to excel in littoral warfare in the 21st Century.
Adaptation Defined
The current state of the literature today defines adaptation narrowly. Adaptation is not synonymous with
innovation or change. Innovation theories are almost entirely focused on major innovative leaps which
generally occur during peacetime when states and their military institutions have the time and resources to
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explore new technologies and innovative concepts. Innovation studies have focused on rare but significant
shifts requiring both a new “theory of victory” and the creation or change of a primary combat arm.6
Most theorists, starting with Theo Farrell, head of War Studies at King’s College London, define
adaptation as something that occurs in wartime. Farrell defined adaptation as a “Change to strategy, force
generation, and or military plans and operations that is undertaken in response to operational challenges
and campaign pressures.”7 This notion of force generation includes weapons and new equipment, and the
supporting doctrine. This definition captures the reaction/response character of adaptation that dominates
the literature.
Adaptation was shorted during the RMA movement, as it was focused on creating new victory
mechanisms and new domains. But now, there is a surge of detailed studies about military organizations
learning and changing based on operational experience. This includes books by Meir Finkel, Wick
Murray, James Russell, Janine Davidson, and Chad Serena. 8 This rich body of literature has generated a
greater appreciation for wartime change and the incorporation of inputs from real operational experience
generated at the edge of the organization at the tactical level.
In my research “Adaptation is the alteration of existing competencies at either the institutional or
operational level to enhance performance based on perceived gaps or deficiencies generated by combat
experience during wartime.”9 This involves recognizing or perceiving gaps in performance and the search
for alterations. A number of adjustments and adaptations may be aggregated into a new organizational
competency that constitutes an innovation for that organization. Adaptation is a dynamic process
involving the acquisition of knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to create altered capacity, and
the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize the better operational praxis
across the institution.10 Additionally, this definition, per previous scholarship by Grissom incorporates
“enhanced organizational performance.”11 The change continuum and definition also accepts Farrell and
Terriff’s conception that a bundle of adaptations can lead to the evolution of an aggregate of skills and
methods that constitute an innovation.12
However, now my definition requires adaptation. We can drop the ‘during wartime’ element to
include the alteration of core competencies of the institution in response to anticipated changes in
adversary capabilities or environmental conditions. The rationale for such a definitional change is relevant
to studying the Marine Corps which has often excelled at anticipatory adaptation in peacetime, reflecting
its constant evolution of tactics and operational practice within its fundamental mission and core
competency of amphibious operations. Going back to the 1930s and an equally rich period of history in
the 1990s, the Marines have a noted ability to learn from the experiences of others, and to recognize the
need to adapt competencies that the Nation requires of them well before the next crisis.
Space precludes explaining the attributes that buttress this institutional adaptability of the Corps, but
it is sufficient to underscore that the Marine culture or ethos is a major element as well as its leadership
philosophy.13 In First to Fight, General Krulak, describes adaptation as “a way of life for the Marines.”14
Commanders articulate a mission and their intent as how this objective contributes to the larger objective.
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Subordinates take in the “what” and why, and are left to their own devices to conceive the “how.”15 What
doctrine the Corps does publish extols the value of “adaptability to respond effectively without a great
deal of preparation time to a broad variety of circumstances.16 Overall, the Marine culture is suited to
organizational learning and adaptation. It is not a perfect system. 17 But a penchant for ‘can do’
pragmatism, coupled with an institutional bias for action abets continuous inquiry and adaptation in
peacetime and during war.
Operational Maneuver and Distributed Operations
Adaptation in littoral and expeditionary operations has been a continuous process within the Marine
Corps for the last 25 years, despite pressures to execute contingencies across the conflict spectrum. The
most critical manifestation was the publication of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) in
1996, and its supporting concept, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM). These concepts evidence a great
deal of accurate anticipation about the future operating environment we now take for granted. The
Marines have evolved the initial concepts of OMFTS and STOM by incorporating distributed operations
and distributed maneuver.
Perhaps the most critical adaptation that has been made in the last decade was the eventual
recognition by the Marine Corps senior leadership about the operational impact of the A2/AD threat as it
evolved over the last two decades. The Marine Corps should be credited with recognizing the potential
emergence of A2/AD challenges, particularly the impact of precision munitions back in the 1990s when
they realized that amphibious operations would have to a) start from greater standoff and b) avoid
operational pauses at the beach head, which could easily be targeted. These considerations were not
recognized by most forecasters except by Marine planners back in the 1990s, and they drove the critical
development of new operational concepts and materiel solutions like the V-22 and the Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle which was supposed to launch from 25 miles offshore and transit through
the littorals and seamlessly pass deep into the littoral operating area without days of assembling combat
power and necessary logistics support. These were recognized as operational weaknesses that could be
exploited, and this recognition occurred years before anyone coined the A2/AD acronym.
One can also see further adaptation in the decade long development of Distributed Operations entail
netted units physically dispersed and operating over an extended battlespace. 18 This was a concept
developed by a small cell working for the Commandant that was then deliberately and simultaneously
placed in the professional journals of the Naval Services to abet professional debate and discourse over
the implications of these concepts. 19 Some of the responses were predictable but they were also
professional and productive. 20 Distributed Operations are characterized by decentralization, multidimensionality, simultaneity, and continuous pressure over the adversary’s entire system to preclude his
ability to reconstitute or adjust. Distributed Operations are conducted by squad- to battalion-sized units
operating as part of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Units trained and equipped to perform
Distributed Operations can make a contribution across the full range of military operations from Stability
and Support Operations to Joint forcible entry missions.
This concept is consistent with both current trends in conflict and the enduring aspects of the
operational art. It is particularly oriented on the acute requirements for greater agility, decentralization,
and multi-dimensionality in future conflict.21 Distributed Operations seek to achieve the high degree of
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operational tempo and fluidity inherent to maneuver warfare. Such operations avoid linear, sequential and
predictable operations, and extensive reliance on attrition.
By increasing the ability to simultaneously attack in many directions with all forms of fires and
maneuver, distributed operations create continuous pressure on the opponent. The resulting relative tempo
prevents the opponent from adapting or readjusting his force posture or from effectively reconstituting
capabilities. Continuous pressure degrades the enemy’s overall combat effectiveness, produces paralysis
or induces systemic collapse. The ultimate aim of any commander is to “implant a picture of defeat in his
opponent’s mind.” 22 Continuous pressure, over the breadth of the battlespace, from multiple lines of
attack, is how the Corps seeks to inject this dim chance for success into the opponent’s mind.
The combination of these characteristics blinds and disorients the opponent, and produces a sudden
psychological dislocation when the opponent realizes that his options and assets are declining at an
accelerating rate.
The latest iteration of Marine service concepts, in Expeditionary Force 21 (EF 21), sustains the
original thrust behind distributed operations, particularly in emphasis on the amphibious set of missions.23
This service vision supports the Cooperative Strategy need to:
Conduct sea control and power projection in a more distributed fashion in littoral
environments. This includes employing forward deployed and surge expeditionary forces
that are task-organized into a cohesive amphibious force in order to provide scalable
options to defeat land-based threats, deny enemy use of key terrain, or establish
expeditionary advance bases and oceanic outposts as described in EF 21.24
However, while the Marines got locked into a good solution set for the problem of the 1990s, the
technological developments required for that solution did not keep pace with emerging threats. Stand-off
ranges for amphibious operations, stated at 25 miles, were challenged by projected threat abilities to
identify and strike at the landing force with super-sonic missiles. The requirement for self-deployment
and seamless transition to maneuver ashore gave the AAAV/EFV dual requirements for water and land
operations from a single vehicle that drove up both system complexity and costs. The resulting hybrid
solution, a large vehicle that could plane on the surface at speeds of 25 MPH, was sub optimized for the
increasingly lethal area denial threat. The program offered an expensive solution to a critical national
capability, but at $12-15M a copy with extensive O&M costs, it was not seen as cost effective. Even more
daunting was the limited force protection the vehicle offered, a $15M target for a $150 EFP. Eventually,
the Marines have realized that they must continue to search for an operationally relevant capability that
better deals with the ground side of the equation. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle program reflects this
critical adaptation, as the continued search for creative solutions to support hi-speed and self-deploying
vehicles.25 Marine concepts underscore the greater need for standoff distances of 65 nm, the need for
distributed maneuver thru multiple penetration points, and critical need for a combination of connectors to
gain positional advantage in the complex littoral terrain.26
Distributed STOVL Operations
In parallel with this new technology, the Marines are adapting their doctrine and tactics to maximize
aviation support to the MAGTF via a concept known as Distributed STOVL Ops or DSO. 27 The
22

Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, London: Brassey’s, 1994, p. 227.
Expeditionary Force 21, Forward and Ready: Now and in the Future, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps, March 4, 2014.
24
Department of the Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready, Washington DC,
March, 2015, p. 32.
25
General Joseph Dunford, Testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington, DC, Feb. 2015.
26
EF 21, p. 22.
27
This section relies heavily upon the description provided in LtGen Jon Davis, USMC, “Forward to the Fight,” Marine Corps
Gazette, May 2015, pp. 20-42.
23

44
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

capability inherent in a STOVL jet allows the Marines to operate in pretty limited or adverse conditions
and from remote locations where few airfields are available for conventional aircraft. The F-35B supports
doctrinal maneuver warfare and operational needs for close air support in austere conditions, and it does
so in the locations our Marines need them the most. The ability to operate from runways of less than
3,000 feet provides a more than three-fold increase in the number of airfields worldwide that STOVL
aircraft can use. STOVL aircraft can operate from expeditionary airfields constructed from airfield
matting or on no airfield infrastructure such as developed roads or even large parking lots. Naturally, the
Marines have used this flexibility to a degree with the AV-8B Harrier and thus are adapting a skill set
within a changed environment.
The foundation of future STOVL operations is the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter executing DSO to exploit
the agility and multi-faceted capabilities of the 5th Generation jet. DSO is a task-organized MAGTF
operation employing STOVL aircraft in a distributed force posture, independent of fixed infrastructure, but
just on a temporary basis. The transitory use of DSO sites mitigates the antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD)
threat, increasing the sites the opponent has to reconn, reducing the effectiveness of preplanned targeting,
expanding the possible sites they must strike with G-RAMM systems, and cutting the number of assets at
risk in each location.
DSO increases early Phase I deterrence efforts and greatly increases sortie generation rates
throughout a conflict. The critical component of DSO is having F-35B aircraft launched from a sea or
land base to conduct multiple missions, with gas, bullets and bombs provided at mobile forward arming
and refueling points (M-FARPs) located closer to or within the operating area. The planes can return to
their seabased platforms or use a field on land. In this way, the M-FARPs achieve protection
incrementally by dispersion, mobility, and deception, while the aircraft operate and rearm outside the
threat engagement zone. This is certainly not a new competency but it is an extension under new
circumstances and thus a major adaptation.28
If one needed to wrap up the stream of adaptation over the past generation within the Marine Corps, I
would summarize it as “the end of the Tarawa Syndrome.” The Marines realize that “hitting the beach” is
passé but that expeditionary excellence is not. Creating a large beach may be old fashioned but creating
and defending a lodgment as part of a larger joint campaign may not be. 29 Adaptation, to both new
opportunities and to evolving threats has been the order of the decade, despite the necessary application of
the Marine Corps in two protracted counterinsurgencies.
Additional Amphibious Adaptations
The Marines need to extend their work to adapt to 21st Century challenges, and the following section
details areas where particular payoff can be garnered. 30
Robotics and Unmanned Systems
The Marine Corps is not new to UAS, having been the first U.S. military service to acquire Remotely
Piloted Vehicles for intelligence and surveillance tasks in the 1980s from Israel. The MCWL has
maintained an active experimental effort in small and micro-UAVs for decades, and the Marines have been
at the forefront of the use of both unmanned ground vehicles for detecting mines and in the use of UAVs
for logistics.31 That said, much more can be done in the employment of UAVs for long loiter fire support to
distributed ground units as captured in operating concepts going back for over a decade now. The Marines
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may have been the first to employ UAS, at the direction of civilian leaders. But they emphasized
intelligence and logistics over fire support.
Additionally, there is a lot of potential in UUV for countering mines in shallow waters, and there is
an additional rich vein of unexploited combat power in unmanned combat breaching systems. For
example, many existing Amphibious Tractors could be converted to Autonomous or Remotely Operated
Assault Breaches. The first wave that hits the beach in a truly contested landing in the next war should
be completely unmanned, but capable of conducted beach reconnaissance, mine clearing, and
suppressive fires. 32
There is also a lot of potentially in applying Marine lessons in UAV Logistics to robotic surface
vehicles to deliver combat service support from shipping directly to the landing area. A swarming
logistics train is a feasible concept.33
Exo-Skeleton Capabilities
A natural transition from purely unmanned system is the employment of human performance
augmentation from exo-skeleton technologies. 34 The use of lower body exo sets could be a huge
advantage to ground units in certain operational contexts. I can think of two major scenarios where this
technology could be immediately useful; in reconnaissance teams and in urban operations.
Strategic Reconnaissance Teams capable of deep interdiction operations with heavier loads, over
longer periods of time, and over rough terrain. Using the load bearing capacity of the emerging Lower
Extremity model, a strategic reconnaissance team could be inserted much further from its objective area
to preclude detection during insertion. With the additional endurance and mobility afforded by the system
the team could travel further and farther, without tiring the team when it arrives at a hide site. A special
operations unit could carry more mission equipment or more rapidly transit an austere area or complex
terrain than is possible today. With the inherent load capacity of the system, the team could lengthen
mission performance periods, enhance mission capability with added systems, and preclude the need for
additional logistics resupply that might compromise the team’s position.
Another option is the design and fielding of urban combat teams capable of bringing heavy weapons,
more munitions, and self-powered breaching or surveillance systems to city fighting. Exoskeleton clad
teams could bring more firepower, greater mobility enhancing systems, and highly advanced force
protection/body armor systems to bear than current infantry units. Exo-skeleton-clad teams could use the
power of the system’s energy pack to operate weapons for creating holes in walls, clearing rooms, or
employing scalable lethal and less than lethal fires. Such teams could include designated team members
with different versions of the suit for various roles with an urban fighting unit. Some members could use
the technology to carry significantly increased forms of body armor. Other team members could be heavy
weapons operators, or breachers, and others could carry additional munitions for the gunners. The capacity
of such teams to rapidly penetrate into urban gaps, employ firepower, and maintain the momentum of the
attack may preclude the traditional difficulties of dangerous and predictable room clearing. The Battle for
Fallujah might have been an entirely different affairs with exoskeleton supported fighters.35
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Expeditionary Power
Another area where the Marines have excelled in adaptation is in exploring expeditionary power sources.
This line of operational experimentation has delivered results, especially in Afghanistan to date.
Technological developments in this field will produce more power, greater flexibility in operations, and
lessen the load on tactical units in maneuver. All naval forces will benefit ultimately from advances in
power generation, but the tip of the tactical spear should not be overlooked. One can envision better
power sources improving C2, intelligence, and logistic burdens, but we should not overlook potential
advances in firepower as well. We can expect further advances in this area which will hopefully increase
combat effectiveness and efficiency, while minimizing the exposure of human and material resources in
support tasks and sustainment.36
Counter-G-RAMM
Finally, future Marine Air-Ground Task Forces may no longer have complete air superiority against
cheap, low flying drones and other Guided-Rocket, Artillery, Missiles and Mortars. Tomorrow’s
improvised explosive devices may not be strewn along the ground, instead they could be IEMs or
Intelligent Explosive Munitions delivered by small drones with target recognition technologies. They may
also be highly precise fires placed on Marine units. Such forces may need to both control their signatures
and generate decoys and have layered defenses against such systems.37
Conclusion
In wrapping up, it should be evident that our national security interests require us to do more than
“command the commons.” The Joint warfighting community recognized the importance of these
operations when it put forward the Joint Concept for Entry Operations.38 The establishment of sea control
as the foundation for power projection is a priority, and the strategic advantages of exploiting sea-based
maneuver must be preserved and extended to our projected security environment.39 Tomorrow’s threats
are larger, more adaptive, and have greater access to technology than in the past. 40
Our assumptions about uncontested access to critical domains are now outdated. We no longer have a
monopoly over access to this great highways of the oceans and we need to break down what Tangredi
called “the great walls” that seek to put our strategic freedom of action at risk.41 Thus, we need to counter
the emergent anti-access problem as suggested in the extensions beyond Air-Sea Battle.42 We should not
forget that the purpose of maneuvering thru the commons was eventually to be able to successfully
maneuver into and achieve assigned political objectives in the risky Contested Zones. Our policy masters
will eventually expect us to contest for control over those dense physical spaces where populations live,
financial institutions have assets, political governance is situated, and where transportation,
telecommunications and energy networks converge. To advance and secure our nation’s interests, we must
master the chaos and ambiguity of the Contested Zones in the littorals. That is where future fights will be
won or lost, and now is the time to begin adapting to that reality.
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PANEL 5: MARITIME WARFARE

FUTURE MARITIME FORCES: UNMANNED, AUTONOMOUS, AND LETHAL
Dr. William F. Bundy
U.S. Naval War College

Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden is leading the U.S. Navy Surface Force towards a transformation into an
offense fighting force through the development and realization of the Distributed Lethality concept. His
vision is to deploy a surface force that has offensive capability in every ship in the Navy. Vice Admiral
Rowden's vision is to create and maintain credible combat power as a strategic deterrence to aggression
throughout the global maritime domain.
Distributed lethality represents a significant operational concept that will ultimately extend across the
U.S. Navy combat force. This of course is an evolving capability based on ships that are in the fleet today
and those that are expected to follow through the shipbuilding program over the next 30 years.
At the same time, the Deputy Assistant Secretary the Navy for Unmanned Systems, Frank Kelly, is
advancing a program to develop unmanned air, surface and undersea vehicles with the possibility of those
vehicles being deployed as semi- and fully-autonomous assets. Unmanned systems have the potential to
deliver capabilities that are now delivered by major combatants, aircraft and submarines.
The combination of Distributed Lethality and unmanned systems has the potential for revolutionizing
maritime warfare. Imagine if you will the arrival of USS BAINBRIDGE DDG 2001 in the South China
Sea to execute a routine maritime patrol in July 2045.
On Patrol in the South China Sea - July 2045
USS BAINBRIDGE DDG 2001 is underway in the South China Sea on maritime security patrol.
BAINBRIDGE's mission is sea surveillance and maritime security operations that are designed to
maintain free access to the maritime commons. Operating 90 miles south of Fiery Cross Island, a People's
Republic of China maritime security base, BAINBRIDGE has deployed three unmanned combat patrol
surface vessels, an unmanned aircraft patrol consisting of three armed airships, and two unmanned
submarines to extend the surveillance coverage of the ship.
In mission control, operators are monitoring communications and data links from their fullyautonomous ships and aircraft that have been programmed to conduct maritime patrols under mission
orders and decision-making control functions that are bounded by prudent navigation, territorial
restrictions and rules of engagement. BAINBRIDGE's unmanned patrols have the technology to sense the
environment, detect and track aircraft and vessels, and report their operating pictures to BAINBRIDGE
via system-to-system networks that create an overall operating picture of the battlespace.
BAINBRIDGE's patrol ships and aircraft have been assigned areas to conduct surveillance and are
expected to execute mission orders that direct their actions based on the current security environment.
Rather than remotely control BAINBRIDGE's unmanned air and surface patrols, advances in intelligent
agent-technology have produced assurances that each of the ships and aircraft will operate within the
rules of safe flight and navigation as well as laws that respect territorial limits and exercise freedom of
navigation. Intelligent agent-technology combined with sensor and decision-making capabilities enable
BAINBRIDGE's patrols to operate in semi-autonomous and fully-autonomous modes of operation.
Developing, testing and employing intelligent control systems in unmanned ships and aircraft will be
a major step forward in the acceptance of fully-autonomous fleet elements. In the past, ships and maritime
patrols were commanded solely by humans. Those captains and flight leaders were required to exercise
initiative and judgment in executing their missions. They were all educated, trained and experienced in
their positions as operational leader. They often made subjective decisions based on incomplete
information and tensions that involved executing the mission while avoiding risk and possible untoward
incidents or collateral damage in combat situations.
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The challenge between now and 2045 is to develop technology that will advance artificial intelligence
to a point where commanders can be assured that autonomous systems will make "decisions" that
conform to safety of flight and navigation and ultimately the laws of armed conflict. This is a vision of
course, but a vision that seems within reach for the Navy. Deploying unmanned fully-autonomous ships,
aircraft and submarines across the maritime domain would revolutionize maritime warfare.
Advancing Maritime Unmanned Systems
During a recent conference on maritime unmanned systems, experts including scientists, technologists,
Navy program managers and war fighters presented arguments for employment of unmanned remotelycontrolled, semi-autonomous and fully-autonomous air, surface and undersea vehicles. There was
optimism during the conference with a note of caution concerning the limits to which commanders
would be assured that "machines" would exercise the necessary behaviors to meet missions beyond
simple surveillance and reconnaissance. The idea of unmanned systems with the capability of
performing detect-to-engage operations was a point a repeated discussion.
The acceptance of semi-autonomous and fully-autonomous fleet elements is predicated on the
reliability, surety and successful testing of sensor to processor to control functions in unmanned ships
and aircraft. The persistent question was would unmanned systems adhere to safe navigation, safety of
flight and the laws of armed conflict while executing "assigned" maritime missions ordered by operators
and commanders.
The Department of Defense has published guidance on the design, development, construction and
intended operation of unmanned systems. That guidance requires system controls and functions that
enable commanders and operators to maintain control of unmanned systems through the range of
military operations.
Our question for discussion is: Can innovative thinkers in our defense or federal laboratories,
industry research and development centers, and/or warfare centers create unmanned systems that can
operate as part of the fleet and deliver on the vision of autonomous operations?
This is an urgent question and necessary quest because our competitors are catching up with us on
the evolution of unmanned systems. Just recently, an article published in the National Interest magazine
reported on Russian efforts to advance underwater spy drones. Dave Majumdar reported:
Russia is developing a family of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, a highranking official in that country’s navy said this week. While the U.S. Navy has been
developing naval drones for more than a decade, this is the first indication that Moscow
is working on similar capabilities.
“Work will be continued in 2016 to develop unmanned boats that can be based both on
ships and on the shore,” Vice Adm. Alexander Fedotenkov, deputy commander-in-chief
of the Russian Navy told the TASS news agency on Jan. 21.
(Russia vs. America: The Race for Underwater Spy Drones, Dave Majumdar, the
National Interest, Jan 21, 2016)
Our U.S. Navy fleet evolution and structure question points to the need to continue and possibly
accelerate research and development on unmanned systems less we allow near-peer competitors to close
the gap and take away our existing advantage.
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PANEL 5: MARITIME WARFARE

THE PRISM OF CLASSICAL NAVAL STRATEGY: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON JAM-GC AND
21ST CENTURY OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
CDR Benjamin “BJ” Armstrong, U.S. Navy
PhD candidate, King’s College London

In March 2015 the Chief of Naval Operations, in cooperation with the Commandants of the Marine Corps and
Coast Guard, released the sea services’ new strategic document The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower. The document encourages sailors, marines, guardsmen, and navalists to understand strategy and to
think strategically. However, despite that direction, the dialogue that has loomed largest in the naval sphere
over the past several years has not been strategy at all, but instead debate about an operational concept. First
as Air-Sea Battle, and now as the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons or JAMGC, this operational thinking has been the center of naval discourse, with a multitude of writings, panels, and
lectures from its developers, supporters, and opponents. In the back and forth we have been introduced to
Offshore Control and Joint Operational Access as well.1
How the United States military and allied navies counter attempts at Anti-Access and Area-Denial has
very important tactical and operational ramifications for the future of the force. However, it is also important to
place the dialogue on operational concepts and operational thinking within strategic context. Strategy is about
making choices and designing efforts to achieve national objectives. Debate that attempts to derive a consensus
on a single operational concept removes choices, and removes the ability to participate in the art of naval
strategy. Therefore, it is important that we make an effort to place analysis of counter-A2AD operating
concepts within a larger discussion of strategy, one rooted in the classical concepts of naval warfare.
The Framework of Naval Strategy
The underlying ideas behind concepts like JAM-GC, Offshore Control, and Joint Operational Access, when
examined through lens of strategy, can help us avoid the funhouse mirror of budget policy and administrative
maneuvering in the Pentagon. Yet, even with the volume of writing on naval operations in the last decade,
articles have tended to lack a genuine engagement with the concepts and structures in the classical naval
theory. A careful reading of many of the articles on this subject, and a detailed consideration of their footnotes,
frequently offers readers the conclusion that this dialogue has been divorced from the actual thinking, writing,
and theory of naval strategy.2
As Bernard Brodie once wrote, “contrary to popular belief, there is nothing especially esoteric about the
basic principles of warfare.”3 From the works of Mahan, Corbett, and Castex, and elucidation of others like
Brodie and Rosinski, we have the foundational idea that naval warfare begins with the question of command of
the sea. But command of the sea is generally insufficient except in the most theoretical form of naval war. The
classical strategists all agreed that while it may be possible, and was the best case scenario, it was unlikely that
establishing command would be enough to force the political objective desired. The enemy gets a vote, and
rarely gives up easily. As a result, there had to be a next step in a naval strategy, a step where the control that
command of sea offered was exercised. To put it as simply as possible, the exercise of this control is achieved
by using the "3 B's" or blockade, bombardment, or putting boots on the ground. This is what led Corbett to his
famous but often misrepresented dictum that “in no case can we exercise control by battleships alone.”4
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Today's discussions tend to ignore these foundations entirely. However, when the lens of classical naval
strategy is used to view the challenge of obtaining a strategic outcome in an A2AD environment, the
operational concepts highlighted over the past two or three years begin to fall into place. When reduced to the
basics, is not JAM-GC a discussion of establishing command of the sea in a modern A2AD environment? By
extension, Offshore Control is our 21st century concept of an East Asian blockade, the CSBA vision of AirSea
Battle has a certain focus on bombardment, and Expeditionary Force 21 and Joint Operational Access Concept
are about putting boots on the ground. By placing these operational concepts within a framework that starts
with strategy, instead of tactics and technology, we gain a different view.5
Strategic Practice v. Operational Planning
Establishing command of the sea and exercising the control allowed by that command through blockade,
bombardment, or putting boots on the ground, is a simplified way of looking at the basics of naval strategy.
Admittedly, from this brief discussion these principles appear sequential but that is not actually the case.
They are simply building blocks of naval warfare and can be put together in an almost infinite number of
ways. Mahan described the conduct of war as an art, writing: “art, out of materials which it finds about it,
[it] creates new forms in endless variety...according to the genius of the artist and the temper of materials
with which he is dealing.”6
Understanding how to combine these elements of naval warfare is the central task of naval strategy. Each
has its own temporal and geographic elements in play as well as a moving scale of totality. Despite what recent
writing on naval affairs tells us, the individual operational parts should not be considered strategies by
themselves or in isolation. Instead, if a navy’s fleet and resources are its means these should be the ways in
which a strategist employs them in order to achieve the political ends desired by the conflict. Thus, localized
command of the sea may be all that a naval force can accomplish, but it also may be sufficient to achieve the
operational objectives desired, or needed, for the political result. Command might also only be established for
a very specific period of time. As John Hattendorf has written, “there are gradations that range from an abstract
ideal to that which is practical, possible, or merely desirable...control is to be general or limited, absolute or
merely governing, widespread or local, permanent or temporary.”7
What tends to be lost when we focus on the individual operational concepts, or the specific tactical
challenges of an A2AD network, is a larger strategic view. We must remember that the scaling of the principles
of naval warfare, and their combination into a method by which the naval strategist hopes to achieve his
nation’s goals, is the heart of the task, not just the tactical employment of technology for kinetic effect. These
are some of the fundamentals we should be discussing when considering the doctrinal and operational writing
of maritime affairs in the 21st century.8
Using Another Lens
As Captain Haynes ably demonstrated in his recent book Toward a New Maritime Strategy, we navalists tend
to be very comfortable engaging in the discussion of how new technologies and new tactics fit into new
operational concepts but that doesn't mean we extend that comfort to strategy.9 We recognize how multiple
tactics and multiple technologies can be combined for synergy into an effective operational ideal. But taking
the next step, viewing strategy in a similar way and exercising the art of combining different operational
concepts to achieve the nation's objectives, we tend to falter. We must always include this element of the
discussion. Just as we always look "downward" to the development of new weapons and technology, our
discussions must also look "upward" to how they contribute to strategy. Use of and understanding of the
established frameworks of naval strategy will help us take the bearings we need to better chart our course.
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PANEL 6: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

ADVANCING THE U.S. SEA SERVICES’ CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO URBAN
HUMANITARIAN DISASTERS AND COMPLEX EMERGENCIES
Dr. Michael D. Lappi
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative

The role of the United States Sea Services during Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response
(HADR) events will become a critical component of international relief efforts in an era of increasing
global warming and coastal urbanization. Core amphibious operational capabilities and the ability to
remain fully self-supporting during prolonged crises will provide an unparalleled opportunity to influence
lifesaving efforts on a global scale. However, the ability to fully utilize the immense capability of the U.S.
Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard team requires continued emphasis on coordination with civilian
counterparts as well as a renewed appreciation for the mastery of the core guiding principles required
during these complex relief operations. With millions of lives potentially in the balance, it is imperative
for the Sea Services to expand education, training, and partnership focused exercises and simulations in
order to fully realize the potential of the fleet.
Coastal urbanization is a critical vulnerability throughout the globe and comprises a significant region
of risk encompassed by U.S. Sea Service operations. Littoral and amphibious operations to address the
emergent needs of these areas has been demonstrated in recent years to be not a matter of determining “if”
it will happen, but a question of “when” it will happen. Operations within these coastal regions can be
considered most hazardous in countries already plagued with poor infrastructure, growing population, and
sparse job opportunities. Migration towards coastal regions typically supporting port or other seafaring
activities can dramatically impact the natural protections afforded by marshland and rugged vegetation as
areas are cleared for housing, subsistence activities, or port development. These dramatic perturbations in
the natural ecosystem can be further enhanced by failures to manage human waste and free flowing
waterways. In this setting, urbanization can result in concentric ecosystems of poverty, poor education,
criminal activity, and decaying societal values unless fully managed by a competent and effective national
system of governance. Without this strong national leadership, the focus on infrastructure development
and maintenance as well as the protection of the population become secondary to the daily management
of crises. Even small perturbations in weather, environment, disease management, or an infrequent
catastrophic event can cripple the patchwork support network of the community. Without this marginal
support, humanitarian activities become mired in community level chaos as dysfunctional organizations
and counter-productive management interrupt the flow of recovery personnel and supplies. It is within
this potentially cataclysmic region that the U.S. Sea Services will be expected to execute sustained and
highly efficient operations.
Key to the creation of a competent and highly resourceful U.S. Sea Service response is the
development of an educational system fully prepared to meet the leadership and operational demands of
this dynamic environment. Embracing the spirit of the Oslo Guidelines and in particular the concept of
“resource of last resort,” U.S. military leaders must fully comprehend the impact of employing military
personnel, equipment, and capabilities into existing humanitarian community actions during crisis
response efforts. While military operations can easily overrun a region, it is the measured employment of
critical assets in coordination with civilian responders that will dramatically impact the overall response.
Areas of particular emphasis for educational endeavors include security cooperation, coordination and
integration of logistics (including integrated airlift capability), heavy equipment and construction
operations, internally displaced personnel and refugee management, the revolution in information
communications technologies used to assess and manage crises, Sphere Standards, and the basics of the
UN cluster systems.
Equally important to comprehensive education is the implementation of intense training programs
that emphasize the critical military capabilities that cannot be easily replicated by civilian organizations.
Core training leading to expertise in mass casualty response, high intensity and sustained logistics, and
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more effective command and control functions provide the opportunity to create the framework for
concurrent or follow-on life saving operations. These functions, while practiced outside of strictly
military organizations, are ingrained in military operations and married to the stress and horrors of battle
that can also be expected during critical or catastrophic disaster and complex emergency response events.
More importantly, the presence of experienced military personnel that consider these operations as an
accepted duty and responsibility will provide an opportunity for daily mentorship to junior personnel and
the backbone of a sustained community. Collectively, this cadre of experts develops a persistent and
resilient force capable of adapting to the intense variability of rescue operations.
Finally, education and training programs, while of vital importance to HADR operations, are of
secondary importance to the necessity for partnership with the humanitarian relief community. The
benefits of inclusive education and training programs that consider the value of partnerships, and
develops the network, relationships, and camaraderie required for sustained operations is the true future
opportunity for success. A deeper understanding for the people, processes, and governing thought within
the humanitarian community creates the foundation of an integrated and intelligent relief system that is
significantly more responsive, flexible, and agile than current efforts. These partnerships can and should
be nurtured through routine and periodic exchange programs, combined exercises, and collective planning
activities that allow organizations with differing cultures and structures to learn to work together.
Conclusion
Despite the fact that HADR is currently prioritized twelfth out of twelve U.S. military missions in the
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, it is the one crisis mission area that we definitively know will be
executed on a routine basis. The relatively low cost of increasing and improving current education,
training, and partnership opportunities is a critical investment in the future success of the U.S. Sea
Services. Greater attention to these areas will ensure the professional execution of these critical
lifesaving missions in increasingly complex urban environments as well as during complex emergencies
for decades to come.
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PANEL 6: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

THE URBAN DILEMMA IN CIVIL-MILITARY HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION
Dr. Ronak B. Patel
Stanford University School of Medicine

The humanitarian sector faces new challenges and opportunities due to urbanization, new manifestations of
violence and their accompanying protection mandates and a growing number of stakeholders. Militaries
coordinating in humanitarian response must also adapt to this new environment.
The trend that cannot be ignored or reversed and will clearly define the environment for future
humanitarian activities and thus, military coordination, is that of urbanization. Military operations in
support of humanitarian missions will increasingly take place in cities. Rapid urbanization means that the
urban population with grow to over 66% by 2050 while the rural population shrinks1. At present, 3 million
people move to cities every week 2 . These urban centers also concentrate risks and hazards to crisis
compounding the likelihood of urban based crisis and response. Humanitarian crises also drive
displacement into cities as the portion of refugees now living in urban areas is over 59% and growing3. As
such, the ground in which militaries engaged in supporting humanitarian missions is shifting into
increasingly complex environments with a multitude of challenges.
Conflict induced humanitarian crises that trigger military coordination make urban crises even more
likely. Power is still reliant on territorial control and cities represent the most valuable territory in modern
states. Cities may become the central battleground as both seats of power and conflict over power. As
violence is no longer the monopoly of the state and their militaries (bound by international humanitarian
law), the growing number and variety of actors (unbound by international humanitarian law) in urban
crises that can influence security will make missions more complex.
Most importantly, urban crises involve a wider variety of civil actors beyond the traditional
international aid agencies, state authorities and national militaries. These new urban landscapes have a
multitude of stakeholders that may need to be engaged in coordination efforts or at least addressed as a
powerbroker or threat to the mission. They include local municipal authorities that now often lead and
coordinate the response, community based organizations as well as local charities that may participate in a
bulk of the effort on the ground, the private sector supplying a broader range of goods and services,
militarized police and private security forces that have been present before the crisis and extremely violent
and competing gangs with de facto territorial control. Understanding who these actors are, their role, power
relations, capacity and legitimacy can be difficult and requires a deeper understanding of context.
Humanitarian organizations themselves find this process challenging when arriving to an urban crisis and
do not yet have industry wide formalized methods of rapidly assessing these multitude of stakeholders.
The latest trend and recommendation for humanitarian action in urban crisis, codified within the Urban
Charter to be released for the upcoming World Humanitarian Summit, is to promote area-based
programming (ABP). This type of humanitarian operation emphasizes a more localized and holistic
approach to crisis response with a detailed understanding of the local context to drive operations that are
community-based to ensure appropriateness and sustainability. This approach requires a more inclusive
approach than the current cluster system allows by taking into account the wider array of civil society
actors and stakeholders. Militaries supporting humanitarian missions or providing peacekeeping and
security for such operations must also face this range of actors.
Additionally, the geography and density of these growing urban landscapers make them operationally
challenging. Many of these rapidly growing cities are marked by large urban slums that make up over
1
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50% of cities in some cases. At baseline urban slums prove very difficult, if not impossible, to police.
They are often completely unmapped areas - difficult to traverse, marked by narrow alleys and footpaths
without any formal roads, signs or lighting and remain largely unfamiliar to non-residents. Even police in
many of these cities do not venture into these areas due to their unfamiliarity and gang control.
The urban violence that marks many cities is also an emerging challenge even in “non-conflict”
disasters (e.g. an earthquake in San Pedro Sula, Honduras) as baseline rates of violence resemble or
surpass declared wars and local capacity or willingness to address it remains weak 4 . The German
Intelligence Agency, in their document on “Ungovernable Megacities,” asserted, “Mumbai, Mexico City
and Jakarta are only partially able to carry out their original core responsibilities of protecting their
population from violence and destabilization.5” Taking on a protection mission into such a scenario for
the local population or the humanitarian actors themselves presents a new challenge for militaries. Safety
for humanitarian staff is difficult to ensure as the situation on the ground can be fluid with information
(and rumors) spreading rapidly and territorial control often in flux.
Moving forward, a new model of civil-military humanitarian coordination may be required. The
principles guiding this will undoubtedly require closer communication. While humanitarian
communication has become more open with mapping (e.g. crisis-mappers) and information sharing
platforms. Military communication systems, by their very nature, are private. A new platform may be
required that allows better communication at some level between civil society actors and the military.
This may be limited to higher levels with the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office for
Foreign Disaster Assistance or other international humanitarian architecture but a new platform will likely
be required to share the detailed and context specific information required in urban crises and specifically
area based programming. Humanitarian actors may also have to align closer to the military for the sake of
security at the cost of some neutrality if hoping to reach beneficiaries in cities characterized by the type of
urban violence described above. It may be that humanitarian and military actors work hand-in-hand in
certain cases rather than in a supporting role. Finally, both humanitarian and military communities would
be better served learning about and exploring coordination together with joint training and workshops,
collaboration on research and innovating technology together. While the characteristics of new civ-mil
relationships can be described, implementing a new operational framework is far off. Yet future crises
will necessitate innovative approaches and evolve new patterns of civil-military cooperation on the
ground that may run ahead of any pre-defined strategy. It is imperative to urgently explore new
frameworks and methods for civil-military coordination to keep pace with the changing environment.
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PANEL 6: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

STRATEGIC SURPRISE AND CLIMATE CHANGE SUPPORT STRATEGIES
Dr. Joseph DiRenzo III
U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development Center

The lessons learned are many just in the past two decades.
In July 1997 it was the explosion of the Soufriere Hills volcano in Montserrat, West Indies; in 2006 it
was Hurricane Katrina along America’s Gulf Coast; in 2010 it was the Haitian Earthquake; and in 2013 it
was Typhoon Haiyan, also known as Super Typhoon Yolanda. What do all these events have in common?
Maritime units, from the U.S Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy and other NATO nations were deeply involved
in providing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) in an urban setting. Each is unique in that
response was modified for the event itself. However, they collectively offer a perfect set of examples to
look for patterns, successful response protocols.
The devastation incurred by each of these events is significant. Take Typhoon Haiyan for example,
according to UNICEF, “Typhoon Haiyan, one of the most powerful tropical storms on record, caused
tremendous damage when it made landfall in the Philippines in November 2013. More than 6,000 people
were killed. Thousands of homes were destroyed. Over 14 million Filipinos, including nearly 6 million
children, were affected”.1
The predicted impact of future events will have on coastal urban areas will be exasperated by climate
change, especially with the expected rise in sea levels. This rise is projected all over the world. Use the
Norfolk Virginia area as an example, home to the Navy’s largest homeport. According to the Washington
Post, normal tides have risen 1 ½ feet over the past decade.2 The same article re-enforced that by the end
of the century the sea level would rise 5 ½ feet. The Post article also noted in a “worst case scenario” with
rapid melting of the earth’s glaciers and ice caps that the rise would be over 8 foot. Now, is this science
exact – no. Are there major detractors in and out of academia – yes. But all the maritime forces within the
United States and NATO would be foolish to simply avoid this issue.
In addition to the rise in sea levels populations have been flocking to the coastal zone to both live and
work. This has added to the concern for one simple reason. As you increase a population along a
seaboard, you increase the urbanization of that area. Look at the growth experienced along Long Island
sound as just one example. According to the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working
Group report, “Coastal population growth in many of the world’s deltas, barrier islands and estuaries has
led to widespread conversion of natural coastal landscapes to agriculture, aquaculture, silviculture, as well
as industrial and residential uses.” 3 It has been estimated that 23 percent of the world’s population lives
both within 100 km distance of the coast and <100 m above sea level, and population densities in coastal
regions are about three times higher than the global average”.4 This shift will exacerbate a fundamental
contingency planning consideration as maritime staffs consider threat vectors. More people will be
concentrated in smaller areas. The challenge in a Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Response (HA/DR)
response scenario just got even more difficult because as a rapid growth in the population occurs along
the coast, coupled with a desire for more and more infrastructure and a rise in sea level you suddenly have
“Perfect Storm Scenario” that when impacted by an significant event, such as an earthquake, requiring a
maritime HA/DR response the result could be quite over-whelming. Due to the possibility of cascading
events maritime forces should continue to refine their doctrine, strategy and Tactics, Techniques and

1

UNICEF (2013) Hurricane Relief – Philippines Typhoon Haiyan,
https://www.unicefusa.org/mission/emergencies/hurricanes/2013-philippines-typhoon-haiyan
2
Lori Montgomery (2014, May 31), In Norfolk, evidence of climate change is in the streets at high tide The Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/in-norfolk-evidence-of-climate-change-is-in-the-streets-at-hightide/2014/05/31/fe3ae860-e71f-11e3-8f90-73e071f3d637_story.html
3
Valiela, I., (2006): Global Coastal Change. Blackwell, Oxford, 368 pp.
4
Small, C., and R.J. Nicholls, (2003) A global analysis of human settlement in coastal zones. J. Coastal Res., 19, 584-599.

56
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Procedures (TTP) to account for these new realities. The response in an urban environment in 2050 will
not be what it is today.
So what approach could be taken by contingency planners and tacticians alike to prepare for the “new
reality”? What events or combination of events could trigger such a need for an HA/DR response? Can
thinking about scenarios that comprise strategic surprise events be used to frame the planning process?
Consider this scenario, which has been widely reported by the international media, the 2000 BBC story
“Mega-tsunami: Wave of Destruction”. 5 The BBC story reported about growing concern of a “geological
time-bombs” around the world which once “triggered” would generate a significant tsunami like event.
The report centered around the island of La Palma in the Canary Island, off north Africa and a future
eruption would unleash a massive landside on the western side of the island.
Based on the BBC’s reporting a major landslide event on La Palma would set up a tsunami which
would “race across the Atlantic at the speed of an airliner”. The report goes on to note that the tsunami’s
impact on Boston would be significant along with other locations along the east coast. This would trigger
a significant response by U.S. Northern Command and the DoD….think Super Storm Sandy x10. Now
apply this scenario to other parts of the world, because if you believe the BBC report, and I do, the impact
will be significant. There are possible “strategic surprise events” around the world.
Additionally, armed with this information you need to ask yourself --- How well prepared are the
maritime services to respond, especially in an urban environment? What lessons specifically from
Typhoon Haiyan and the Haitian earthquake apply here? Has any agency, including NORTHCOM or
other geographic combatant commanders considered this type of scenario as a strategic surprise? What
role do the maritime forces play in a whole of government response?
What do I mean by a strategic Surprise?
In their essay “Ahead of The Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise,” researchers Peter Schwartz and
Doug Randall noted that a strategic surprise differ from a “run of the mill surprise” in that it produces
significant organization and societal impacts, challenges conventional wisdom, and is hard to imagine.6
In the case of La Palma, using the variables above could thinking about this kind of HA/DR response
in the context of a Strategic Surprise be valuable? First, would this type of event produce “significant
organization and societal impacts” – the short answer is yes based on the literature. Second, does this
scenario challenge conventional wisdom? Again…looking at the literature there is a great deal of
skepticism that this would occur. Ok, debate within scientific research areas is expected. Yet, major news
networks from National Public Radio to the BBC have discussed it. Additionally, peer reviewed articles
have explored it.
The final strategic surprise component to consider is simply….is this scenario hard to imagine?
Hmmm, lets look at history and a similar type event – Hurricane Katrina. Even armed with the
information/results, nearly one year to the date, from a Table Top entitled “Hurricane Pam” key planners
still did not believe that a Hurricane Katrina like event could occur especially with the associated HA/DR
response. Isolated case? You be the judge if a La Palma type event is possible….and how the maritime
forces of the United States would approach their response.
To begin to craft a response I want to go old school and consider joint doctrine. JP 3-29 (Foreign
Humanitarian Assistance) published on 3 January 2014. Joint Pub 3-29 does a perfect job of describing
the role played, “Because Department of Defense (DOD) will normally be in a supporting role during
FHA contingency operations, the joint force commander (JFC) may not be responsible for determining
the mission or specifying the participating agencies. Appropriate organization, command and control
(C2), and, most important, an understanding of the objectives of the organizations involved are all means
to build consensus and achieve unity of effort.”
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The unity of effort piece is key….but this has to extend well beyond the tactical level response. The real
value is to look at the lessons learned from multiple events (such as Haiti from an urban perspective) and recraft doctrine, campaign plans and standing “quick response cards” in the tenants of strategic surprise and
then using modeling and simulation to “game out” scenarios to refine the products you have, developed.
As part of the development process, as products such as doctrine are revised leadership needs to
ensure every effort is undertaken to reduce the group-think. How do you do that….by ensuring an “Arch
Protagonist” is appointed to inject “disruptive think”. This approach is invaluable in strategic doctrine
development where the norm is established.
The final area that needs to be re-enforced is leverage every opportunity before an HA/DR event to
get to know your partners – especially the agencies like USAID that coordinate aid and the NonGovernment agencies. Notes JP 3-29:
Increasingly, the resources of the international business community are being utilized to
mitigate human suffering associated with disasters. Businesses donate talent or in-kind
goods and services to disaster relief and recovery operations in developing countries and
wish to ensure that their help is delivered in a coordinated and effective manner. The
same is true for foreign disaster response. Many large private-sector companies maintain
disaster/crisis response teams that can respond and add value to USG operations by
providing infrastructure and other supporting services. DOD mechanisms that plan for,
train, and implement emergency responses to disasters should consider the private
sector. This should be done through USAID OFDA, which maintains communication with
UN agencies and other international organizations and private sector donors to ensure
the USG complements rather than duplicates existing assistance programs. In addition to
large transnational corporations, the private sector also includes the local, national, and
other companies and organizations which should be considered and engaged through the
country team, USAID, or other existing USG channels.7
In conclusion, the world is changing. Our climate is indeed changing….its’ “vital signs” highlight
projected changes in sea level height and storm significance. Couple this with the destructive power of the
La Palma volcano and the need for a well developed and trained HA/DR effort that can scale up and
down, and work across both interagency but also internationally – with governments and NGOs alike.
How can the Maritime Forces of the United States be ready for this type of issue…simply…look at what
science is saying what the art of the possible --- what scenarios would create a possible HA/DR
event..especially in an urban event…then use a strategic surprise framework to prepare for it. Understand
who your partners are, what the hurdles are, what the authorities are upfront will make the response much
easier to coordinate. This isn’t anything new in HA/DR….but what is new is the partners involved…what
if China or Russia rush a response to scene…are your plans flexible enough to work with them?
One final recommendation….after your strategy, doctrine and plans are revised to considered the
unexpected….set up a group to critically review them….using disruptive thinking…look for the gaps by
asking the what if questions. By doing so your overall response will be more resilient, and better prepared
to handle a La Palma event. Strategic Surprise is coming and HA/DR planners looking at an urban
environment need to embrace it – know your partners and think disruptively.
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PANEL 6: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

IMPROVING CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION AND PROTECTING AID WORKERS
Ms. Julia Brooks
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative

A number of important developments and trends are forcing us to rethink humanitarian response in
general, and civil-military engagement in particular. These include: the increased frequency and impact of
natural disasters and complex emergencies, exacerbated by the effects of climate change; rapid
urbanization and population growth, and with it, urban poverty, violence and instability;1 and the increased
involvement of international militaries in responding to these crises, alongside humanitarian actors.
To this list of trends, I’d like to add several more concerning ones: First, while large-scale killing in
violent conflicts is decreasing, volatility and low-intensity conflicts are increasing. 2 Second, forced
displacement is at record levels, with over 60 million people currently displaced around the globe, the
majority of whom, 38 million, are not refugees but rather internally displaced.3 If the population of forcibly
displaced were a country, it would reportedly be the world’s 24th largest.4 Displacement is also contributing
to urbanization in two ways: first, the majority of the world’s refugees and displaced persons now end up in
cities and towns, not refugee camps; 5 and second, as people remain longer in displacement, some of
today’s largest refugee camps – such as Dadaab camp in Kenya or Zaatari camp in Jordan – are likely to
become tomorrow’s cities.6
The third trend is growing disrespect for international law and humanitarian norms, and with it, a
staggering increase – nearly four-fold – in the number of violent attacks against humanitarian aid workers
over the last decade.7 In many of the world’s conflict zones – especially Afghanistan, Syria, South Sudan,
Central African Republic and Pakistan – the Red Cross or blue shield, once designed to distinguish and
protect humanitarians from attack, is increasingly becoming a bull’s-eye. The urban dynamic is also
important here, since discrimination in targeting becomes even more difficult in complex emergencies in
big cities, given the density of population and complexity of actors. While some of these attacks against aid
workers occur as a result of indiscriminate or mistaken targeting, the majority appear to be deliberate.8
Moreover, we know all too well that threats and attacks on humanitarian aid workers do not only
emanate from non-state armed groups. Following the U.S. airstrike on its trauma center in Kunduz,
Afghanistan on October 3rd of last year, for example, MSF facilities were hit by Saudi-led coalition
airstrikes in Yemen on October 26th and December 2rd, and by airstrikes in Syria on November 21st and
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28th.9 And MSF is by no means the only organization to suffer from the recent incidents of violence against
aid workers and facilities. As a result, some such aid organizations now consider conventional armed forces
to pose a greater threat to the security of their staff than insurgent groups certain environments.
And while devastating in their own right, attacks against aid workers have had even more devastating
consequences for the populations they serve, curtailing access and depriving vulnerable populations of lifesaving assistance. The result is a critical challenge for civil-military coordination and the humanitarian
sector: How to provide the best assistance possible to populations in need, marshaling all the resources at
our disposal – both humanitarian and military – to respond to crises? How to create a “new model of civilmilitary humanitarian coordination”, as many have appropriately called for, without jeopardizing the
essential neutral, impartial, independent, and ultimately, humanitarian nature of emergency response, and
with it, secure access for aid workers?
Many have already called for increased education and training, and these are critical. Military and
humanitarian communities must get to know each other better, and participation in joint trainings and
simulations is a great start. There is also a need for better means of communication and information sharing
to ensure that this dialogue continues during operations, when it is needed most.10 And more research is
clearly needed to inform policy making, as much of it remains anecdotal or experiential today.
But militaries must also know when not to engage in humanitarian response. This also requires research,
training and informed policy-making. We need to be wary of the militarization of humanitarian aid, as much
as the humanitarianization of military operations. We need to recognize when the needs of vulnerable
populations and affected communities are best served by civil-military cooperation, such as in certain largescale natural disasters, and when they are best served by a clear separation between military and
humanitarian action, such as in many conflicts and complex emergencies. This is important not just in terms
of joint operations, where militaries engage alongside humanitarian actors. We must also question situations
where militaries provide aid on their own, especially in the course of counterinsurgency or “hearts and
minds” campaigns. Humanitarian agencies have frequently cited such operations as contributing to
perceptions of them as legitimate targets of attack in countries like Afghanistan, now among the deadliest
for aid workers.11
Improving civil-military coordination calls for us to work better together, and there are many
circumstances in which that can make a real difference. Yet especially in conflicts and complex
emergencies, protecting aid workers also calls for us to learn to work better apart. In some cases, this is
because military involvement in humanitarian operations may pose an inherent risk to aid workers and
beneficiary populations, especially when militaries are also belligerents in a conflict. In other cases, this is
because experience demonstrates that both parties have not yet learned to work together effectively, and
disregard for the implications of their actions are putting aid worker and civilian lives at risk.
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